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Federalism and the treaty Power: Breaking the 
“Bond(s)” Between nations: the treaty Power and status 
oF Forces agreements1
dru Brenner-Beck2
 
 
The Constitution reposes the treaty power in the two political branches3 and makes treaties the 
supreme law of  the land.4  What limits exist to cabin this power have been the subject of  debate 
since the drafting of  our Constitution.  In addition to limits to the treaty power generally recognized 
as imposed by the Bill of  Rights and other specific constitutional protections,5 the question of  
whether the treaty power is restrained by a subject-matter limitation or the federalist structure of  our 
government and the Tenth Amendment has been a recurring issue.  
Debates over the subject matter limitations of  the treaty power have existed since the nation’s 
founding. At its inception, the treaty power was seen primarily as a means to regulate the United 
States’ intercourse with foreign nations, with its exercise to be consistent with those external 
aims.  Often quoted on the scope of  the treaty power is James Madison’s statement that the treaty 
power, as a distinctly federal power, was to be exercised “principally on external objects, as war, 
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce.”6  This statement has been used to support both a robust 
treaty power, as well as arguments by proponents of  federalism-based limits on that power that 
1 This article builds on my prior article, written with Prof. Geoffrey Corn, addressing the much broader reflections 
of  treaty practice in Law of  Armed Conflict treaties, to be published as Viewing Treaties through a Military Lens: Testing the 
Limits, (with Prof. Geoffrey Corn), forthcoming in 38:2 Harvard Journal of  Law and Public Policy (Apr.- May 2015).
2 Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Formerly served as Deputy Legal Counsel, 
US Army’s Office of  the Inspector General and Chief, Military and Civil Law, U.S. Army Europe. After retirement 
served as a law clerk to the Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, US. Court of  Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and legal consultant 
on international law matters. She is also the President of  the National Institute of  Military Justice.
3  u.s. const., art. II, §1, art. II § 2, cl.2, and art. I, § 8, cl.18. The Constitution also prohibits States from entering into 
treaties. u.s. const., art. I, §10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; . . .”).
4 u.s. const., art. VI, cl. 2.
5 louis henkin, Foreign aFFairs and the u.s. constitution 185 (2d ed. 1996) (“It is now settled, however that 
treaties are subject to the constitutional limitations that apply to all exercise of  federal power, principally the prohibitions 
of  the Bill of  Rights.” For example, a treaty could not cede a State’s territory without its consent (Art. IV., sec. 3, cl. 1) 
or modify the republican form of  state government (Art. IV., sec. 4)); see also Treaties and Other International Agreements: 
The Role of  the United States Senate, u.s. congressional research service, Jan. 2001, available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT66922.pdf  [hereinafter Senate on Treaties] (“It seems clear from 
the Court’s pronouncement in Geofroy v. Riggs that the treaty power is indeed a broad one, extending to ‘any matter which 
is properly the subject of  negotiation with a foreign country.’ However, it is equally apparent that treaties, like Federal 
statutes, are subject to the overriding requirements of  the Constitution.”).
6 the Federalist no. 45, at 289 (James Madison)(emphasis added); see United States v. Bond (Bond II), 681 F.3d 149, 159 
n.11 (3d Cir. 2012).
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treaties may deal only with matters of  “international concern.”  Yet both Hamilton and Madison 
also emphasized that a precise definition of  the power was undesirable because the treaty power 
was intended to be flexible in order to address future contingencies unknown to the drafters.7   
Regardless, a primary purpose of  the new Constitution was to eliminate the problems of  the 
Confederation where federal treaty obligations were frustrated by the states.8
It is unsurprising that treaties dealing with the Laws of  Armed Conflict (LOAC) remain at the 
core of  the treaty power.  What is surprising is that that LOAC treaties have been the focal point 
of  recent federalism challenges to its exercise. The willingness of  the Supreme Court to consider 
federalism challenges to the treaty power in this core “national” area, specifically in the case of  Bond 
v. United States,9 may indeed indicate that its revival of  federalism concerns in Commerce Clause 
cases may augur some additional restrictions on treaty implementation. Such restrictions would be 
especially significant as exercises of  the treaty power that also implicate the political branches’ war 
powers would appear to be due the upmost deference by the courts.
The failure of  the Confederation to adequately constrain state interference with treaty 
obligations was a key motivating factor in the decision to convene the Constitutional Convention.10  
The States’ failure to comply with provisions of  the Treaty of  Paris ending the Revolutionary War 
placed the early republic in existential jeopardy.11 Rather than adopting substantive limits to the treaty 
power, the Constitutional Convention instead adopted a broad treaty power, relying on political and 
structural limits to control its abuse.12  Despite the broad nature of  the treaty power adopted by the 
Convention, Thomas Jefferson later construed the treaty power narrowly, contending it was limited 
7 Bond II, 681 F.3d, at 160; see also 3 the deBates in the several state conventions on the adoPtion oF the 
Federal constitution, as recommended By the general convention at PhiladelPhia, in 1787, 514-15 (Jonathan 
Elliot 2d ed., 1859) (“The object of  treaties is the regulation of  intercourse within foreign nations, and is external. I do 
not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which such external regulations would be necessary. Would it be right 
to define all the cases in which Congress could exercise this authority? The definition might, and probably would, be 
defective. They might be restrained, by such a definition, from exercising the authority where it would be essential to the 
interest and safety of  the community. It is most safe, therefore, to leave it to be exercised as contingencies may arise...”); 
see also henkin, supra note 5, at 186 (citing the Federalist no. 23 (Hamilton), that powers essential to the common 
defense, “[O]ught to exist without limitation . . . The circumstances that endanger the safety of  nations are infinite, and 
for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of  it is committed.”).
8 See Medallin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 543 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the Federalist no. 42, p. 264 (James 
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (Supremacy Clause “disembarrassed” the Convention of  the problem presented by the 
Articles of  Confederation where “treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of  the States”).
9 Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014); Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011).
10 See Medallin, 552 U.S. at 543; David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, The Law of  Nations, and the Pursuit of  International Recognition, 85 n.y.u. l rev. 932, 934-935 (2010) [hereinafter 
A Civilized Nation].
11 Chris DeRose, Founding rivals: madison v. monroe, the Bill oF rights, and an election that saved a 
nation, 55-70 (2011).
12 Oona A. Hathaway, Spencer Amdur, Celia Choy, Samir Deger-Sen, John Paredes, Sally Pei, Haley Nix Proctor, The 
Treaty Power: Its History, Scope and Limits, 98 cornell l. rev. 239, 249 (2013) [hereinafter The Treaty Power] (noting that the 
requirement for advice and consent from two-thirds of  the Senate was an important political and structural constraint 
on the treaty making power. The Senate was the body designed to provide equal representation for all States regardless 
of  size or population, and prior to the passage of  the Seventeenth Amendment, Senators were elected by the state 
legislatures. The Seventeenth Amendment supersedes Article I, § 3, clauses 1 and 2 of  the Constitution).
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to those subjects traditionally regulated by treaties between sovereign states, excluding those rights 
normally reserved to the states, and further excluding those subjects normally requiring participation 
by the House of  Representatives.13  This narrow view, apart from rendering the treaty power a 
functional nullity, is not supported by the drafting history of  the Constitution’s treaty provisions 
during the 1787 Constitutional Convention,14 nor by historical practice following its ratification.15 
Jefferson’s view of  the treaty power reflected his narrower conception of  the scope of  federal 
power generally. Additionally, although Madison initially supported a strong federal government 
within its enumerated powers, both Madison and Jefferson altered their views on the nature of  
the federal compact and the ability of  States to negate federal actions after the passage of  the 
1798 Alien and Sedition Acts early in our history.16  Their arguments in the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions, as well as Madison’s Report of  1800, premised upon the concept of  the Constitution 
as a compact between sovereign States, formed the basis for later State’s rights arguments which 
ultimately led to secession and the Civil War.17  As a result, Jefferson and Madison’s later developed 
concept of  reserved powers also served as a potential limitation on the impact of  treaty obligations 
13 henkin, supra note 5, at 189-90 (saying that in his later years, Thomas Jefferson construed the treaty power 
narrowly believing it limited to those subjects traditionally regulated by treaties between sovereign states and excluding 
those rights normally reserved to the states and further to exclude those subjects normally requiring participation 
by the House of  Representatives. This narrow view, apart from rendering the treaty power a functional nullity, is not 
supported by the drafting history of  the Constitution’s treaty provisions during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, nor 
by historical practice following its ratification); see Senate on Treaties, supra note 5, at 27-29 (2001) (discussing the treaty 
provision: “By September 4 delegates had agreed that the President ‘‘by and with the advice and consent of  the Senate, 
shall have power to make treaties,’’ and that no treaty shall be made without the consent of  two-thirds of  the Senators 
present [t]his portion of  the report was brought up for discussion on September 7. James Wilson of  Pennsylvania 
moved to add the words ‘and House of  Representatives’ after the word Senate because, he said, since treaties ‘are to 
have the operation of  laws, they ought to have the sanction of  laws also.’ As to the objection that secrecy was needed for 
treaty making, he said that factor was outweighed by the necessity for the sanction of  both chambers. Roger Sherman of  
Connecticut argued that the requirement of  secrecy for treaties ‘forbade a reference of  them to the whole Legislature.’ 
Wilson’s motion was defeated.”).
14 The Treaty Power, supra note 12, at 246-47.
15 United States v. Bond (Bond II), 681 F.3d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2012); A Civilized Nation, supra note 10; David M. 
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: the Historical Foundations of  the Nationalist Conception of  the Treaty Power, 98 mich. l. 
rev. 1075 (2000) [hereinafter Treaty-Making and the Nation]; Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty Implementing Power in Historical 
Practice, 56 wm. & mary l. rev. 59 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275355; 
erwin chemerinsky, constitutional law: PrinciPles and Policies 287 (4th ed. 2011); henkin, supra note 5, at 191; 
Brief  of  Amici Curiae Professors David M. Golove, Martin S. Lederman, and John Mikhail in Support of  Respondent, 
Bond v. United States, 2013 WL 4737189, No. 12-158 (Aug. 16, 2013); contra Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and 
American  Federalism, 97 mich. l. rev. 390, 395 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power]; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Executing The Treaty Power, 118 harv. l.rev. 1867, 1875 (2005) [hereinafter Executing the Treaty Power].
16 Donald Burke, James Madison’s Dystopian Vision: The Failure of  Equilibrium, 43 am. J. legal hist. 254, 259, 279 (1999) 
[hereinafter Madison’s Dystopian Vision]; H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of  ’98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 va. l. 
rev. 689, 690-692 (1994).
17 See Powell, supra note 16, at 692 (noting that Jefferson and Madison went on to explain and justify their narrow 
construction views on the basis of  a full-fledged theory of  the Constitution’s origins, nature, and purpose. The 
Resolutions proclaimed that the Constitution was a compact between the sovereign states as high contracting parties; the 
obligation to give a narrow construction to the powers delegated to the “general government” as the states’ common 
agent flowed directly from the constitutional fact of  the states’ undiminished sovereignty.”).
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within the states.
Despite the treaty power being entrusted solely to the federal government by the Constitution, 
its potentially unlimited scope made it a focus for concern over federal intrusion into matters 
traditionally entrusted to the states.  Neither the Convention nor state ratifying conventions 
provided any guidance on how the national government was expected to enforce the nation’s treaty 
obligations, primarily because treaties were envisioned to be self-executing.18  The operation of  
the Supremacy Clause was seen as the primary mechanism to implement the treaty power, making 
treaties the supreme law of  the land by binding “the Judges in every State . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws or any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”19  Because of  the assumption 
that treaties automatically became the supreme law of  the land once ratified in accordance with 
constitutional process, the extent of  Congress’s ability to legislate to implement a treaty, particularly 
if  outside of  other federally enumerated powers, was not addressed at the Convention.  As the 
doctrine of  non-self-execution developed,20 it provided proponents of  a broad and a narrow treaty 
power another avenue to use the historical record to support their respective views. Nevertheless, 
no court has declared a congressional act implementing a treaty void because of  its impact on states’ 
rights.21 
Significant scholarship in the last ten years has not only analyzed the scope and history of  the 
treaty clause as part of  the drafting and adoption of  the U.S. Constitution, but also the practice 
of  the federal government in implementing this power.  Representing opposing views of  this 
recurring debate, Daniel Golove’s views supporting a broad treaty power are opposed by scholars 
such as Curtis Bradley and Nicolas Rosenkratz, who seek to limit the domestic effect of  the treaty 
power to those areas already within a federally enumerated power.22  These dueling histories place 
the treaty power in its historical context, and interestingly are not new to the analysis of  the treaty 
power.23  Early in the 20th Century, similar evaluations of  the history and judicial precedent outlined 
18 The Treaty Power, supra note 12, at 250-51 (“Evidence that Founding-Era treaties were largely meant to self- execute 
includes the placement of  treaties in the Supremacy Clause, an overt endorsement of  self-execution at the North 
Carolina ratifying convention, and statements like Jefferson’s in his Manual of  Parliamentary Practice that “[t]reaties are 
legislative acts. A treaty is a law of  the land.”); A Civilized Nation, supra note 8, at 940, 994, 999-1000.
19 u.s. const., art. VI, cl. 2.
20 See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, J.) (“A treaty is in its nature a contract between 
two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of  itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far 
as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of  the respective parties to the 
instrument. In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law 
of  the land. It is, consequently to be regarded in courts of  justice as equivalent to an act of  the legislature, whenever 
it operates of  itself  without the aid of  any legislative provision . . . . But when the terms of  the stipulation import a 
contract, when either of  the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself  to the political, not the 
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”).
21 See Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (noting that the Court has never held a statute implementing 
a valid treaty to exceed Congress’s enumerated powers).
22 Executing The Treaty Power, supra note 15; compare A Civilized Nation, supra note 10; Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra 
note 15, with Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 15; see also edwin s. corwin, national suPremacy, treaty Power vs. 
state Power at 73 (Forgotten Books ed., 2012) (1913) [hereinafter corwin, national suPremacy].
23 See, e.g., Charles Henry Butler, 1 the treaty making Power oF the united states (1902) [hereinafter Butler, 
the treaty making Power], available at http://books.google.com/books?oe=UTF-  8&id=L6AMAAAAYAAJ&q=
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hauntingly familiar arguments based on U.S. practice and historical analysis.24  Although both Corwin 
and Butler, two leading scholars at the turn of  the 20th Century, concluded that the Civil War had 
resolved the outstanding questions on the treaty power in favor of  its broad scope unhindered by 
any reserved power of  the states,25 the Supreme Court had not explicitly determined if  Congress’s 
ability to legislate to implement treaties was limited to its otherwise enumerated powers.26 
In the view of  many, this uncertainty was resolved by Missouri v. Holland.27  The decision seemed 
to foreclose any federalism argument limiting Congressional implementation of  a valid treaty.  In 
that case the Supreme Court rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to legislation implementing 
john+randolph+tucker#v=onepage&q=john%20randolph%20tucker&f=false; see corwin, National Supremacy, supra 
note 22 (arguing for broad treaty power, and creation of  one sovereignty of  all people of  United States); see also John 
Randolph Tucker, 1 the constitution oF the united states: a critical discussion oF its genesis, develoPment, 
and interPretation, 294-301 (Henry St. George Tucker, ed.) (1899) (as basis of  states’ reserved rights, Tucker expounds 
on full sovereignty of  founding states and arguing that the “people” referred to in the preamble were the people of  the 
various sovereign states, not of  one sovereignty of  the United States), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=X
sy0vyHmFM0C&pg=PA11&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false [hereinafter Tucker, constitution].
24 See Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1265-66 (arguing that Holmes’ central theory about the nature 
of  the Tenth Amendment was based on his adoption of  Corwin’s thesis that the people of  the United States formed 
a single sovereignty and as such the United States was fully sovereign within its enumerated powers. In rejecting the 
reserved powers implications of  the states’ rights advocates, premised upon Madison and Jefferson’s Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions, he saw the Civil War as having resolved the central notion of  one nation, which rejected the 
right of  a state to secede); see also Butler, the treaty making Power, supra note 23, at §§ 15-16, 142 (describing 
proponents of  the States’ rights view pre-bellum as John C. Calhoun and Chief  Justice Taney and John Phillip Butler in 
the ante-bellum period, contrasted with broad constructionists Chief  Justice Marshall and Justice Story pre-bellum, and 
Justices Field, Gray and Miller after the war); see also Tucker, constitution, supra note 23, at 294-301 (expounding on 
full sovereignty of  founding states and arguing, as a basis of  states’ reserved rights, that the “people” referred to in the 
preamble were the people of  the various sovereign states, not of  one sovereignty of  the United States).
25 See corwin, supra note 22, at 301-02 (“More rigorous exponents of  this [state’s rights] doctrine would confine 
the treaty-power to the field of  powers which, exclusive of  the treaty-power, are delegated to the United States, but 
the difficulties attaching to this view were admitted by Jefferson himself, who took if  from Nicholas, and it has been 
hopelessly discredited by the history of  negotiation, and adjudication thereon. But there are more far-reaching objects 
to the State-rights view of  the treaty-power upon the score of  history. Not only was this view sustained during the 
period of  its greatest prominence by immediate concern for a great sectional interest which no long exists, but it rests 
upon a view of  the fundamental character of  the Constitution that is without historical warrant: the view, namely, that 
the Constitution was a compact among the State sovereignties; from which view was deduced quite logically, but to the 
utter defiance of  the history of  the matter, the proposition that the States in the exercise of  their reserved powers are 
capable of  confronting the National Government in the exercise of  its delegated powers, when the two jurisdictions 
clash, as equal sovereigns.”); Butler, the treaty making Power, supra note 23, at § 3  (“That the treaty-making power 
of  the United States as vested in the Central Government, is derived not only from the powers expressly conferred by 
the Constitution, but that it is also possessed by that Government as an attribute of  sovereignty, and that it extends to 
every subject which can be the basis for negotiation and contract between any of  the sovereign powers of  the world . . 
. [t]hat the power to legislate in regard to all matters affected by treaty stipulations and relations is co-extensive with the 
treaty-making power, and that acts of  Congress enforcing such stipulations, which in the absence of  treaty stipulations, 
would be unconstitutional as infringing on the powers reserved to the States, are constitutional, and can be enforced, 
even though they conflict with State laws or provisions of  State constitutions.”)
26 When faced with such a question in 1920, Justice Holmes relied extensively on Corwin’s treatise, national 
suPremacy, to structure his opinion and inform his conclusions; Treaty-making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1257-58.
27 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (tellingly, Congress itself  sees Missouri v. Holland as dispositive of  the 
issue of  whether they have authority to legislate in support of  a ratified treaty); see Senate on Treaties, supra note 5, at 66-67.
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the 1916 U.S./Canadian Migratory Bird Treaty.  Absent the treaty, Congress had been held to lack 
authority to legislate to protect migratory birds.28  In a concise opinion, Justice Holmes writing 
for the Court rejected the position that the Treaty and its implementing legislation were void as 
“an interference with the rights reserved to the states.”29  Echoing back to Madison’s prescient 
description of  the necessity of  flexibility in the treaty power, Justice Holmes stated, “When we are 
dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of  the United States, we 
must realize that they have called into life a being the development of  which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of  its begetters.” Evaluating the treaty power, the Court held, 
“It is obvious that there may be matters of  the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an 
act of  Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could.”30  Recognizing 
that qualifications to the treaty-making power “must be ascertained in a different way,”31  the Court 
determined first that the provision did not contravene any prohibitory language in the Constitution. 
The Court then queried further, “[t]he only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible 
radiation from the general terms of  the Tenth Amendment.”32  For Justice Holmes, that question 
could only be answered by considering what “this country has become in deciding what that 
amendment has reserved.”33  In upholding the Act, Holmes concluded, “No doubt the great body 
of  private relations usually fall within the control of  the State, but a treaty may override its power.”34  
Although the 1920 Missouri v. Holland decision settled the issue of  the scope of  both the treaty 
power and Congress’s authority to legislate to implement treaties, what “invisible radiations” exist to 
circumscribe the federal treaty power remains an open question. Thirty years later, Missouri v. Holland 
would once again be subject to national debate as states’ rights advocates attempted to amend the 
Constitution to alter its conclusions.  The context for this renewed debate was about as far removed 
from migratory birds as imaginable, and instead dealt with a core national security interest of  the 
nation: U.S. involvement in the most important mutual defense relationship in our nation’s history.
a. the nato status oF Forces agreement (soFa) treaty:  Bricker strikes again.
The late 1940s and early 1950s required the United States to reevaluate its place and role in the 
world in the aftermath of  World War II.  In the immediate aftermath of  World War II, the United 
States supported the creation of  the United Nations as a replacement for the ineffective League 
of  Nations.  Participating in the negotiation of  the 1949 Geneva Conventions during this critical 
period, the United States sought to incorporate the lessons drawn from its experience in the recent 
devastating total warfare of  World War II and establish a world-wide standard of  humanity in 
warfare.35  The commencement of  both the Cold War and the Korean War resulted in the creation 
28 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 433.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 433-34.
33 Id. at 434; see discussion at note 24.
34 Id.
35 See Olivier Barsalou, Making  Humanitarian Law in the Cold: The Cold War, The United States and the Genesis of  the 
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of  new multi-lateral alliances designed to meet the challenge of  global communism, as well as the 
first utilization of  the United Nations in a response to a threat to international peace.  Following 
the commencement of  the Korean War in June 1950 and its stalemate beginning in June, 1951, the 
Senate held consideration of  the 1949 Geneva Conventions in abeyance at the request of  the State 
Department from 1952 to its approval in 1955.36  During this period in June 1953, the Senate also 
considered giving advice and consent for the ratification of  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
Status of  Forces Agreement.  The NATO Treaty itself  had been ratified by the United States with 
Senate consent within a three month period in 1949,37 and the NATO SOFA was intended to resolve 
the legal status of  military forces stationed in other NATO-partner countries as this multilateral 
defense treaty came into effect.38 
Consideration of  the NATO SOFA Treaty occurred at a time of  increasing domestic 
controversy over the proper roles of  treaties in domestic U.S. law, particularly in light of  the 
ratification of  the United Nations Treaty in July 1945, and the newly proposed UN International 
Covenant on Human Rights.39  Following World War II, the United States saw both an expansion 
Geneva Conventions of  1949 38 (IILJ Emerging Scholars Paper 11, 2008), available at  http://www.iilj.org/publications/
documents/Barsalou.ESP11-08.pdf.
36 See Geneva Conventions on the Protection of  War Victims:  Senate Report on Hearings Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
84th Cong. 4 (1955) [hereinafter Senate GC Hearings Rpt.], available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_
histories/pl104-192/hear-060355-1955.pdf  (noting that although the 1949 Geneva Conventions had been negotiated 
and signed in 1949, they had not yet been considered by the Senate by the time of  outbreak of  the Korean War in 1950. 
The State Department asked the Senate to defer consideration of  the Conventions to allow the battlefield experience of  
the Korean War to be incorporated into the United States’ decision to ratify the Conventions. The ongoing war under 
the auspices of  the United Nations raised significant issues on the viability of  the Geneva Conventions in a war with 
non-parties to the Conventions, particularly with the significant prisoner of  war issues that extended from World War 
II and continued into the Korean War. The Senate took up consideration of  the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1955, 
allowing it to incorporate the lessons learned from the Korean War into its evaluation of  the wisdom of  the treaty).
37 NATO Chronology of  Events, harry s. truman Presidential liBrary, available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
nato/natocron.htm.
38 SOFAs, address the legal status of  military forces present in a foreign country with the consent of  the receiving 
state, and in particular, “how the domestic laws of  the foreign jurisdiction apply to U.S. personnel. See R. Chuck Mason, 
Status of  Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, u.s. congressional research service 
(RL34531; Mar. 15, 2012), 1 n.2, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf. [hereinafter CRS SOFA 
Report] (depending on the terms of  each SOFA agreement, “U.S. personnel may include U.S. armed forces personnel, 
Department of  Defense civilian employees, and/or contractors working for the Department of  Defense.  The scope 
of  applicability is specifically defined in each agreement.”) Although specific SOFAs define these terms in the context 
of  each particular agreement, they are generally useful to describe the relationship existing between states when 
friendly military personnel are sent to another nation at the invitation of  the host state. Military Personnel sent “on 
official business may be sent as part of  a force or individually. See Major Manuel E. F. Superveille, The Legal Status of  
Foreign Military Personnel in the United States, 1994-MAY the army lawyer 3 (1994) [hereinafter Superveille] (discussing 
international law principles of  territory, nationality, passive personality, and protection as a basis for differing views on 
allocation of  criminal jurisdiction over visiting foreign military forces).
39 Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15; see Arthur H. Dean, The Bricker Amendment and Authority over Foreign 
Affairs, 32 Foreign aFF. 1, 3-5 (1953) (“The primary function of  the Federal Government in the conduct of  our foreign 
relations has always been- but is much more consciously so today- that of  providing a policy that will ensure national 
survival . . . . We have chosen a combination of  national strength and active diplomacy, achieving a compromise between 
the theory- perhaps exploded by scientific assaults on time, space, and the atom- of  an isolated continental fortress and 
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of  federal power at the expense of  the states and the strengthening of  the executive power at the 
federal level.  Conservatives, concerned over these developments, “feared that these trends would 
be accelerated by America’s increasingly active role in world affairs, especially its participation in the 
United Nations . . . . and sought to limit the domestic effects of  the nation’s growing international 
involvement.”40  Although differing from the traditional pre-World War II isolationists, conservatives 
in the early 1950s equated the expansion of  federal executive power (often at the expense of  the 
states) with increased involvement by the United States in world affairs.41  This, and heightened 
concern over the potential impact of  new human rights treaties on U.S. domestic law, seen as posing 
a danger to racial segregation and state sovereignty,42 sparked renewed opposition in Congress 
over the scope of  the Treaty power. Leading the effort to restrict treaty powers was Senator John 
Bricker, who in 1951 embarked on a battle to overturn Missouri v. Holland43 and limit the Treaty 
power through constitutional amendment.44  Senator Bricker’s various attempts to amend the U.S. 
Constitution included prohibitions on the domestic operation of  any U.S. treaty absent specific 
enabling legislation passed by Congress making its provisions operative domestically, and limits on 
the subject-matter of  such legislation to that already authorized Congress in Article I.45 
In the early 1950s, both parties in Congress “fundamentally viewed the world situation in 
the same way,” with President Eisenhower “inherit[ing] his basic national security structure from 
the Democratic Truman, and adopt[ing]the broad outlines of  his policies.”46  During this critical 
juncture in our nation’s struggle against an increasingly dangerous Soviet threat, the United States 
was engaged in the Korean War, had over 3.6 million men in uniform, was allocating billions of  
dollars to defense, and was involved in a policy of  “active diplomacy . . . to coordinate the military 
the theory of  some supranational polity. This compromise has appeared in an age of  global military problems in which 
the free nations of  the world must jointly meet the threat of  a monolithic totalitarian dictatorship ruling one-third of  the 
peoples and natural resources of  the world . . . the policy of  the past decade has been that of  an active diplomacy backed 
by military preparedness. This course has required active Congressional support.”); see also duane tananBaum, the 
Bricker amendment controversy, a test oF eisenhower’s Political leadershiP 103-07 (Cornell Univ. Press, 1988).
40 tananBaum, supra note 39, at ix.
41 tananBaum, supra note 39, at 1.
42 Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1274; see also tananBaum, supra note 39, at ix.
43 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
44 Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1274-75.
45 From 1951 to 1954, when it was ultimately defeated, Senator Bricker proposed various Constitutional amendments. 
The tests and focus of  these various proposed amendments changed, at times focusing on substantially limiting the 
federal treaty power, and at others, on paring it or requiring implementing legislation by Congress in order to make it the 
law of  the land. See generally tananBaum, supra note 39 (providing an excellent discussion of  the Bricker Amendment 
controversy). At its most basic, these efforts to amend the Constitution included the fundamental provision of  the 
various proposed amendments that: “A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through 
legislation which would be valid in the absence of  treaty.” See also henkin, supra note 5, at 192.
46 The Senate and a Bipartisan Foreign Policy: 1953-1960, 132 Cong. Rec. S4960-03, at 2 (1986) [hereinafter The Senate 
and a Bipartisan Foreign Policy]; see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of  U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67-aut law 
& contemP. ProBs. 169, 179 (2004) (“[A] certain ‘brand of  anti-internationalism runs deep in the American political 
tradition.’ However much this tradition ebbed and flowed beforehand, it seems clear that it receded for a sustained 
period in light of  World War II, the Cold War, and the consensus for U.S. international engagement that the two 
conflicts fostered. It should therefore have come as no surprise that the end of  the Cold War would have eroded that 
consensus and the dominant legal vision that sprang from it.”)(citation omitted).
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and economic strength of  the free world in meeting the threat of  Soviet power.”47  Necessary to this 
policy was the creation of  an extensive network of  treaties and executive agreements.
“An expression of  isolationism of  a very powerful kind,”48 Bricker’s attempt to amend the 
Constitution reflected discomfort with the increasing number of  treaties and executive agreements 
entered into by the United States to meet the threat of  Soviet power and ensure U.S. national 
security interests after World War II,49 and the related desire to limit their domestic effect.  Although 
ultimately defeated in 1954, Senator Bricker’s proposed Constitutional amendment caused significant 
concern in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations because the proposed alteration of  the 
treaty power would seriously disrupt the exercise of  U.S. foreign policy.50  Conducted simultaneously 
with its deliberation over the Bricker Amendment, the Senate considered the NATO SOFA Treaty.  
The debate over this treaty, and the reservation proposed by Senator Bricker, intended to alter one 
of  the treaty’s fundamental articles detailing criminal jurisdiction, reflected the underlying domestic 
political dispute over U.S. foreign policy and the role of  treaties in U.S. law generally present in the 
early 1950s.
During the Senate’s 1953 deliberations on the treaty, Senator Bricker seized on the treaty’s 
allocation of  criminal jurisdiction over visiting military forces as the focal point of  his sovereignty- 
and federalism-based opposition. In an effort to nullify the concurrent jurisdictional arrangement 
of  the treaty – whereby ‘receiving’ nations shared concurrent criminal jurisdiction over foreign 
military forces stationed in their national territory – Bricker offered a reservation to retain sole 
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel overseas in exchange for granting the same status 
to foreign soldiers in the United States.  His opposition to the criminal jurisdiction provisions of  
the NATO SOFA, discussed in greater detail below,51 reflected both a narrow understanding of  
jurisdiction over military forces generally, and a resistance to the increasing role of  the United States 
as a global power with binding international commitments.52  The Senate’s ultimate rejection of  
Senator Bricker’s reservation and its discussion and comprehension of  the effect of  these provisions 
on domestic U.S. law, reflect its perception of  the ultimate benefit gained from the integrated NATO 
47 Dean, supra note 39, at 4-5; see also The Senate and a Bipartisan Foreign Policy, supra note 46, at 2.
48 Burt J. Abrams, Bricker Measure is Called Isolationist by Prof. Corwin, 77 daily Princetonian 141 (Jan. 6,1954), available 
at http://theprince.princeton.edu/princetonperiodicals/cgi-bin/princetonperiodicals?a=d&d=Princetonian19540106-
01.2.10&srpos=1&e=-------en-20--1--txt-IN-corwin+bricker; see generally Cathal J. Nolan, The Last Hurrah of  Conservative 
Isolationism: Eisenhower, Congress, and the Bricker Amendment, 22 Presidential studies Quarterly 337-49 (1992); Srini 
Sitaraman, state ParticiPation in international treaty regimes, 171 (Ashgate 2013).
49 See Dean, supra note 39, at 4-5 (“Secretary of  State Dulles . . . estimated that over 10,000 executive agreements had 
been entered into in relation to the NATO Treaty alone.”).
50 See Dean, supra note 39, at 2; tananBaum, supra note 39, at 71-72 (noting that although the 1954 vote was seen 
as the defeat of  the Bricker Amendment, Senator Bricker made numerous attempts from 1951 to 1958 to amend the 
Constitution to overrule Missouri v. Holland and limit the domestic effect of  the treaty power).
51 Infra, pages 19-23.
52 Senator Bricker’s view that the law of  the flag governed criminal jurisdiction over troops present in foreign nations, 
resulted in his conclusion that the NATO SOFA impermissibly expanded foreign jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen. 
His proposed reservation offered to preserve law of  the flag jurisdiction for U.S. servicemembers (a view not accepted 
universally in international law), but also for foreign NATO servicemembers present on United States soil. His        
amendment would have completely removed criminal jurisdiction from U.S. states, an ironic outcome when considered 
against his attempts to amend the U.S. Constitution to limit the domestic effect of  treaties.
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defense effort—an exercise of  national foreign policy--particularly when considered with the 1955 
ratification of  the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1949 ratification of  the NATO Treaty itself.
understanding the uniQue challenge oF visiting Forces and the genesis oF the nato 
status oF Forces agreement
Prior to the twentieth century there were few instances of  the peacetime presence of  military 
forces within a foreign country outside the context of  belligerent occupation or allied wartime 
cooperation.53  While it was generally understood that a friendly military force conducting 
consensual transit through the territory of  another sovereign retained jurisdiction over its transiting 
soldiers,54 this limited understanding did not create a norm of  customary international law regarding 
the allocation of  jurisdiction more generally, and in particular for the longer term consensual basing 
of  forces in another state.  Instead, two competing views existed on the issue of  criminal jurisdiction 
over visiting military forces; yet neither emerged as the prevailing view prior to the advent of  World 
War I.  The most ‘force-protective’ theory was a view advanced by early American scholars, that 
of  the “Law of  the Flag.”  According to this view, the sending state’s law55 applied exclusively to 
its military forces at all times absent an international agreement to the contrary, providing visiting 
friendly military forces absolute immunity from a receiving state’s criminal jurisdiction.  In contrast, 
British and other commentators focused on the territorial jurisdiction of  the receiving state, 
recognizing at best concurrent jurisdiction between the territorial receiving state and the sending 
state’s disciplinary authority over its own armed forces.56  Because of  the uncertainty of  international 
law governing visiting friendly military forces, nations entered into specific international agreements 
to delineate criminal jurisdiction over their forces during World War I, and again in World War II.57 
The specific arrangements adopted by these wartime agreements usually reflected the need 
and bargaining positions of  the nations involved. For example, France granted exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction to visiting Allied armed forces in World War I, a manifestation of  France’s urgent need 
for allied intervention and recognition that her Allies were in effective control of  their respective 
53 A discussion of  colonial military presence in various nations is beyond the scope of  this article.
54 See Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, JA 422, 
Operational Law Handbook 120 (Major Andrew Gillman et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Operational Law 
Handbook], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2012.pdf; see The 
Agreement Regarding Status of  Forces of  Parties of  the North Atlantic Treaty: Supplementary Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 83d Cong. 47-51 (1953) [hereinafter Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing] (discussing The Schooner Exchange v. 
M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) (1812)).
55 When discussing SOFAs, the terminology, “sending state” and “receiving state” are important, delineating the 
nation whose troops are sent to the foreign nation, and the foreign nation receiving those troops. These terms are used 
in the NATO SOFA because its reciprocal nature results in a nation being both a sending and receiving state depending 
on the specifics of  the locations of  the nation’s military forces in the territory of  other nations.
56 See Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 47-51 (discussing the two countervailing international views 
and practice on these two theories, and United States historical cases rejecting the asserted theory of  absolute immunity); 
Superveille, supra note 38; see also Murray L. Schwartz, International Law and the NATO SOFA Agreement, 53 colum. l. 
rev. 1091, 1094-99 (1953).
57 See Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1094-99.
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areas of  responsibility.58  In contrast, only the United States successfully negotiated exclusive 
jurisdiction with Britain over U.S. forces present in the United Kingdom during World War II.59  As 
to other Allies, Britain authorized the exercise of  jurisdiction by friendly forces only for discipline 
and internal administration, and it retained exclusive British jurisdiction over murder, manslaughter, 
and rape- offenses that could be tried solely by British civil courts.  In an ostensible move to 
reciprocate the British grant of  exclusive jurisdiction to visiting American forces in World War 
II, Congress enacted the U.S. Service Courts of  Friendly Foreign Forces Act of  1944.  However, 
Congress rejected a proposed provision in this statute divesting U.S. courts of  jurisdiction over 
visiting British forces, instead acting to “implement whatever jurisdiction the foreign service courts 
brought with them to this country.”60  Thus the passage of  this statute was at best a recognition of  
concurrent jurisdiction.61 
In 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain established a 
multilateral defense alliance in response to the perceived Soviet bloc threat after World War II. 
This Brussels Treaty “contemplated the stationing of  allied troops in each other’s countries for 
an indefinite period of  time,” and therefore, it included a SOFA which explicitly recognized not 
only the existence of  the receiving state’s jurisdiction but which also allocated criminal jurisdiction 
between the sending and receiving states based on the degree of  harm caused by the offense to 
each State.62  Although never coming into effect, this arrangement became the basis of  the NATO 
SOFA’s criminal jurisdiction allocation provisions.  In 1952, Britain passed the Visiting Forces Act.  
This Act paralleled the provisions of  the NATO SOFA, and “vitiate[ed] the 1942 grant of  exclusive 
jurisdiction” to the United States.63 
the nato soFa
It was against this backdrop that the United States Senate considered the NATO SOFA Treaty, 
which provided for shared jurisdiction between sending and receiving states.  The international 
law territoriality principle of  jurisdiction recognizes the legitimate authority of  nations to assert 
criminal jurisdiction of  all persons found within their borders, an incident of  sovereignty exercised 
by all nations today, including the United States.64  However, all states may also consent to limit this 
58 Id. at 1095.
59 Id. at 1096 (explaining that nevertheless, the 1942 U.K. Act granting exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. over its forces 
was seen as “a “very considerable departure ... from the traditional system and practice of  the United Kingdom”).
60 The Senate Committee Report on this legislation stated that Senators Murdock and McFarland, who were in charge 
of  the bill, had rejected the position that United States’ courts be divested of  jurisdiction and indeed doubted whether 
Congress had the authority to prohibit jurisdiction on the part of  the State courts over criminal matters. See Senate 
NATO SOFA Supp. Hearings, supra note 54, at 46 (statement of  Senator Murdock); see also Superveille, supra note 38, at 
7-9.
61 See Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 46 (indicating a belief  that international law already 
restricted jurisdiction to the sending State).
62 Superveille, supra note 38, at 9-10.
63 Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1096-97.
64 restatement (third) oF Foreign relations law oF the united states, § 402(1) (1987).
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sovereign authority, which is the key function of  a SOFA.65 
In 1953, however, not all members of  the U.S. Senate- most notably, Senator John W. Bricker- 
were willing to acknowledge the applicability of  territorial jurisdiction over visiting forces. Based 
largely on Justice Marshall’s dicta in The Schooner Exchange case,66 there was substantial scholarship 
at the time supporting the view that exclusive criminal jurisdiction over friendly visiting military 
forces lay solely in the sending state under the Law of  the Flag doctrine.67  Therefore, because 
he contended that the foundational premise upon which the NATO SOFA was based was 
fundamentally flawed,68 Senator Bricker proposed a reservation to the Resolution of  Ratification 
“giving American military authorities exclusive jurisdiction over American forces committing crimes 
in Europe and giving NATO allies the same authority over their troops in the United States.”69  
Senator Bricker’s willingness to waive U.S. territorial jurisdiction appeared to rest on at least two 
(mistaken) assumptions: first, that the SOFA would only apply to military forces entering the United 
States as an organized unit, not as individuals; and second, that the absolute number of  foreign 
military members in that status in the United States would be small.70  For Bricker, the law of  the 
flag was a core norm of  both international and U.S. law, and he therefore considered the shared 
jurisdiction framework of  the NATO SOFA to be an impermissible expansion of  the jurisdiction 
of  receiving states over visiting U.S. forces.71  Senator Bricker’s reservation to the NATO SOFA 
65 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 136 (7 Cranch) (1812) (“The jurisdiction of  the nation within its own 
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of  no limitation not imposed by itself.”); Munaf  v. Geren, 
553 U.S. 674, 694-700 (2008); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (“We think it now fully established that the plenary criminal authority of  a friendly host nation during peacetime is 
undiminished by the bare fact that the accused is a member of  a military force stationed there.”); Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 
F. Supp. 97, 100 (D.D.C. 1968).
66 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 136 (7 Cranch) (1812).
67 Justice Marshall’s discussion in The Schooner Exchange of  the exclusive jurisdiction of  the foreign nation when a 
friendly foreign force is allowed to pass through the territory of  another nation is often cited as a basis for the Law  of  
the Flag doctrine assertion of  exclusive criminal jurisdiction in the visiting sovereign. See Schwartz, supra note 56, at 47-
50; see Superveille, supra note 38, at 7-8; see also Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 9-37 (incorporating 
article by Archibald King, Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces).
68 Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 3.
69 See dwight d. eisenhower, To William Fife Knowland, July 14, 1953, the PaPers oF dwight david eisenhower 386 
(Louis Galambos ed., 1970) [hereinafter Eisenhower Letter to Knowland]; see also Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra 
note 54, at 1 (quoting the text of  the Bricker Amendment to the NATO SOFA, “The Senate advises and consents to the 
ratification of  Executive T, Eighty-second Congress, second session, regarding status of  forces of  parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty, signed at London on June 19, 1951, subject to the reservation, which is hereby made a part and condition 
of  the resolution of  ratification, that the military authorities of  the United States as a sending State shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the members of  its force or civilian component and their dependents with response to all offenses 
committed within the territory of  the receiving State, and the United States as a receiving State shall, at the request of  
a sending State, waive any jurisdiction which it might possess over the members of  a force or civilian component of  a 
sending State and their dependents with respect to all offenses committed within the territory of  the United States.”); see 
also tananBaum, supra note 39 (discussing how Senator Bricker’s proposed amendment to the NATO SOFA treaty was at 
issue contemporaneously with his more famous attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution by severely limiting the federal 
government’s treaty power.
70 Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 4 (estimating that the total number of  NATO Troops in the 
United States at any one time at 3000).
71 Substantial debate also centered on the fundamental rights accorded to accused soldiers under European civil law 
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Treaty, however, seemed to contravene the principles he advocated in his proposed constitutional 
amendment—if  adopted, the NATO SOFA treaty would totally deprive the states of  “their normal 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in their territory.”72  For the Eisenhower Administration, passage 
of  the NATO SOFA was inextricably intertwined with the battle over the Bricker Amendment, 
and it “waged an all-out fight to win approval of  the Status of  Forces Agreement without any 
reservations,”73 arguing that the NATO SOFA was necessary to “carry forward the vital program for 
the integrated defense forces of  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”74 
On July 14, 1953 President Eisenhower sent a public letter to Senator William F. Knowland, the 
Acting Senate Majority Leader, emphasizing the critical importance of  ratification of  the NATO 
SOFA, concluding that failure to ratify these agreements without reservations “could result in 
undermining the entire United States military position in Europe . . . [and that r]atification would be 
a great forward step cementing the mutual security effort among the Nations of  the Free World.”75  
Senator Knowland read the President’s letter to his Senate colleagues that same day.  Later that day 
the Senate defeated Senator Bricker’s proposed reservation, and on July 15, 1953, approved the 
NATO SOFA by a vote of  72-15.76 
By giving advice and consent for ratification of  the NATO SOFA without Bricker’s proposed 
reservation, the Senate ultimately rejected his narrow view of  criminal jurisdiction, but also affirmed 
the American commitment to leading the defense of  the free world.  Although the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee was concerned about the exercise of  criminal jurisdiction over ‘our boys’ by 
foreign nations due to fundamental differences in legal systems and basic rights,77 its advice and 
systems, focusing on the lack of  rights to appeal right to a jury trial, rights to a public trial and to be tried publically 
before a jury, as well as the lack of  bail provisions and a provision preventing cruel and unusual punishment. See Senate 
NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 57-60, 81 (explaining that Senator Bricker also referred back to the Senate 
hearings on the Service Courts of  Friendly Foreign Forces Act in which some Senators felt that Act was a nullity because 
it sought to grant what some Senators believed was already U.S. law on criminal jurisdiction- that jurisdiction lay solely in 
the sending State); see also Agreement Regarding Status of  Forces of  Parties of  the North Atlantic Treaty:  Hearings before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, 83d Cong. 30-31, 57-60 (1953) (hereinafter Senate NATO SOFA Hearing).
72 See tananBaum, supra note 39, at 105 (quoting Herman Phleger, State Department Legal Advisor).
73 Id.; see also CRS SOFA Report, supra note 38, at 2 (listing four reservations included by the Senate in its resolution of  
ratification for the NATO SOFA, “(1) [T]he criminal jurisdiction provisions contained in Article VII of  the agreement 
do not constitute a precedent for future agreements; (2) when a service member is to be tried by authorities in a 
receiving state, the commanding officer of  the U.S. armed force in that state shall review the laws of  the receiving state 
with regard to the procedural safeguards of  the U.S. Constitution; (3) if  the commanding officer believes there is danger 
that the servicemember will not be protected because of  the absence or denial of  constitutional rights the accused would 
receive in the United States, the commanding officer shall request that the receiving state waive its jurisdiction; and (4) 
a representative of  the United States be appointed to attend the trial of  any servicemember being tried by the receiving 
state and act to protect the constitutional rights of  the servicemember.”).
74 Id.
75 See Eisenhower Letter to Knowland, supra note 69; see also tananBaum, supra note 39, at 106.
76 tananBaum, supra note 39, at 106.
77 The Senate focused on the list of  procedural rights accorded by Article VII(9) of  the NATO SOFA, and the 
absence of  other rights familiar to Americans, specifically, the lack of  a guarantee to a jury trial, the presumption of  
innocence, a public trial, and to a ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Recognizing that this SOFA would inevitably 
serve as a baseline for future SOFA agreements, with agreements with Japan under consideration at the time of  
ratification, the Senate understood the importance of  the due process rights enunciated by the Treaty, and those not 
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consent to ratification indicated acceptance of  the trade-off  inherent in the reciprocal nature of  
NATO SOFA criminal jurisdiction provisions and the balance it reflected between the needs of  
the sending and receiving States in the integrated defense effort supporting U.S. foreign policy. 
The State Department, and ultimately the required two-thirds of  the Senate,78 concluded that the 
NATO SOFA provided more protection to U.S. soldiers overseas, albeit at the cost of  jurisdictional 
concessions within the United States.79  The Senate understood both the necessity of  a continued 
U.S. military presence in Europe to counter the growing Soviet threat, and the concomitant 
necessity of  treaty arrangements to deal with long-term peacetime stationing of  large numbers of  
soldiers in other countries. The Senate’s approval also marked a significant foreign policy victory 
for the Eisenhower Administration, and had “important implications for the fight over the Bricker 
Amendment,”80 with thirteen Senators who had previously supported Bricker’s constitutional 
amendment, voting for ratification of  the NATO SOFA.81  Significantly, the debate over the NATO 
SOFA “illustrated some of  the debilitating effects the Bricker Amendment would have, such as 
preventing the United States from entering into the Status of  Forces Agreement.”82  Rejecting claims 
by proponents of  the Bricker Amendment that the NATO SOFA “provided further proof  that a 
constitutional amendment was needed to protect the rights of  the American people,”83 the votes by 
the thirteen Senators who had supported Bricker’s constitutional amendment were essential to its 
approval.
The Senate, accepting both the NATO Treaty itself  and the NATO SOFA, understood both 
the necessity of  mutual defense arrangements and the concomitant restriction on U.S. unilateral 
action.84  Ratification indicates that both  the President and the Senate accepted the necessity of  
binding international ties in the U.S. policy of  “active diplomacy,” even when those agreements 
affected both the rights of  U.S. soldiers overseas, and the jurisdiction of  domestic U.S. courts.  Such 
a consensus in the midst of  the ongoing controversy over Senator Bricker’s multi-year attempt to 
amend the Constitution and reverse the conclusions of  Missouri v. Holland, had broader significance: 
an endorsement and recognition of  the importance of  federal control of  the treaty power, even in 
the face of  significant effects on what were traditional areas of  state control, such as criminal justice. 
It similarly reflected rejection of  the view of  inherent subject matter limitations on the treaty power 
as Bricker’s various defeated constitutional amendment proposals included purported attempts to 
limit legislation in support of  treaties to those areas already within federal enumerated powers. 
Since that time, treaties have become an even more significant mechanism for the regulation of  
armed conflict, and therefore even more vital to the national security interests of  the United States.  
included as well. See Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54, at 70, 80-82; see also tananBaum, supra note 39, at 
103-107.
78 Bricker’s reservation was defeated by a vote of  53-27, with the NATO SOFA approved by a vote of  72-15, 
providing the Administration a comfortable margin. See tananBaum, supra note 39, at 106.
79 See Senate NATO SOFA Supp. Hearing, supra note 54 at 68-69, 72-75, 84-87 (citing Department of  Justice testimony 
and Senate discussions of  effect of  jurisdictional provisions).
80 tananBaum, supra note 39 at 107
81 Id. at 106, n. 30.
82 Id. at 107.
83 Id. at 106.
84 See Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 68-75.
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Indeed, multi-lateral treaties have evolved as the predominant means of  controlling the development 
of  the laws of  war.  Nonetheless, the controversy over the nature of  the relationship between 
the nation’s treaty powers and federalism limitations once again arose in the context of  a treaty 
regulating the conduct of  war: the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  Once again the 
legacy and meaning of  Missouri v. Holland would become the focal point of  controversy in the early 
21st Century.
a. the curious case oF ms. Bond and the chemical weaPons convention (cwc)
In the decades that followed the Court’s enunciation of  the treaty power in Missouri v. Holland, 
there was no serious challenge to the Congressional ability to legislate in support of  treaties– until 
2009.  Congress has long considered Missouri v. Holland as dispositive of  the issue of  whether it 
has authority to legislate in support of  a ratified treaty.85  However in 2009, a case appealing a federal 
conviction based on punitive legislation implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention opened 
the lid on what so many assumed was a conclusively sealed jar.  
In United States v. Bond,86 Carol-Anne Bond contested her prosecution in federal district court 
for use and possession of  a chemical weapon in violation of  the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of  1998 and its associated criminal provisions.  The permissible reach of  this 
statute, enacted to implement a critical LOAC treaty was central to her challenge, and highlights the 
issues with which courts must grapple when faced with a federalism challenge to the Constitution’s 
Treaty powers.
The Senate provided advice and consent to ratify the CWC in 1997 after extensive negotiations 
and discussions with the White House.  Apart from significant political brokering between the two 
political branches to accomplish this end, the Senate held extensive hearings on the constitutional 
issues it perceived as potentially problematic in the CWC and its proposed Implementation Act.  
Foremost among them were Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns related to the verification 
regime proposed under the Convention.  However, there was no indication of  any concern related 
to the constitutionality of  legislation to implement the ratified Convention, particularly as the terms 
of  the Convention had been drafted to be consistent with the requirements of  search and seizure 
law and the constraints imposed by the U.S. Constitution.87   
Accordingly, following the 1997 ratification of  the CWC, Congress passed the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of  1998 along with its associated penal provisions.88  
These penal provisions included 18 U.S.C. § 229, which implemented the U.S. obligation to 
85 Senate on Treaties, supra note 5, at 66-67.
86 United States v. Bond (Bond I), 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
87 See Examining the Constitutionality of  the Convention on the Prohibition of  Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of  
Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction Opened for Signature and Signed by the United States at Paris on January 13, 1993: Hearings 
Before Subcomm. on Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights of  the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 106, S. Hrg. 104-
859 (1996) [hereinafter Senate CWC Constitutional Implications Hearing] (discussing how the Convention was drafted “to 
specifically allow the U.S. Government, in granting access to facilities identified for challenge inspections, ‘to tak[e] into 
account any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures’).
88 Bond I, 581 F.3d, at 133.
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criminally sanction individuals who violated provisions of  the convention, in particular, use or 
possession of  a chemical weapon.
Closely tracking the language of  the CWC, the relevant portions of  the statute under which 
Bond was charged prohibit:
                                                                                                                                                                   89
When Carol-Anne Bond discovered that her best friend Myrlinda Haynes had been impregnated 
by Carol-Anne’s husband, she began a campaign of  harassment against her former friend.  Focused 
on revenge, Bond obtained two potent toxic chemicals, 10-chloro10H-phenoxarsine and potassium 
dichromate, either of  which can prove deadly at doses of  less than one-half  a teaspoon, and which 
can cause toxic harm to humans after minimal topical contact.  On at least twenty-four separate 
occasions Bond spread these chemicals on her friend’s mailbox, car door handles, and home 
doorknob.  Although Ms. Haynes normally noticed the chemicals and avoided them, on at least 
one occasion, she “sustained a chemical burn to her thumb.”  After the local police proved less 
than responsive, Ms. Haynes complained to her local post office.  Postal inspectors investigated and 
ultimately arrested Bond.  She was charged in federal district court with two counts of  possessing 
and using a chemical weapon in violation of  18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), and two counts of  mail theft.90  
Among other motions, Bond moved to dismiss the chemical weapons charges claiming that § 229 
was unconstitutional because “it violates principles of  federalism embodied in our Constitution.”91  
The district court denied her motions ruling that § 229 did not violate the principles of  federalism 
because it was properly enacted by Congress and signed by the President under the necessary and 
proper clause of  the Constitution to comply with the terms of  a treaty.92  Subsequently, Bond 
89 See 18 U.S.C. § 229(a); see § 229F(1)(A) (defining “chemical weapon” as a “toxic chemical and its precursors, 
except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent 
with such a purpose”); § 299F(8)(A) (defining “toxic chemical” as “any chemical which through its chemical action 
on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals”); § 299F(7)(A) 
(noting that permitted purposes include “any peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
pharmaceutical activity or other activity”).
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 1708; see Bond I, 581 F.3d, at 132.
91 See Bond I, 581 F.3d, at 132-33 (Bond also claimed § 229 violated the fair notice requirements of  the Due Process 
clause. The district court rejected this argument as well, ruling that “the statute is not vague, [because] it is clear that if  
anybody uses a toxic chemical for other than peaceful purposes, th[at] person can be prosecuted”).
92 Id. at 133.
(a) Unlawful conduct--Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly--
(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, 
receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any 
chemical weapon; or
(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph (1), 
or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1).
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entered a conditional guilty plea reserving her right to appeal.93 
The facts of  Ms. Bond’s case94 certainly exemplify the concern over the federal criminalization 
of  conduct which would otherwise have been considered local and left to the ministration of  
the State of  Pennsylvania.  On appeal, Bond argued that § 229 was unconstitutional because it 
permitted a massive expansion of  federal law enforcement into areas traditionally reserved to the 
states “without regard to the federalism boundaries enshrined in the Constitution, [and] violates 
“the unique system of  federalism protected by the Tenth Amendment.” She argued that permitting 
federal prosecution of  “localized offenses” was a “massive and unjustifiable expansion of  federal 
law enforcement into the state regulated[] domain.”95  Unsurprisingly, the government, relying on 
Missouri v. Holland, responded that the Tenth Amendment did not bar Bond’s prosecution because 
Congress had the authority to enact the statute “under the Necessary and Proper Clause of  the 
Constitution as a law enforcing its Treaty Power.” Rather than addressing the Tenth Amendment 
argument on its merits, the Third Circuit, joining five other Circuit Courts of  Appeal, held instead 
that Bond did not have standing to raise the Tenth Amendment argument absent involvement of  a 
state or state official.96  Bond appealed this ruling.  
In resolving this circuit split on “the question whether a person indicted for violating a federal 
statute has standing to challenge its validity on grounds that, by enacting it, Congress exceeded its 
powers under the Constitution, thus intruding upon the sovereignty and authority of  the States,”97 
the Supreme Court explained:
                                                                                                   98
Thus, after the Supreme Court’s first Bond decision, persons injured by the application of  treaty 
provisions or treaty-implementing legislation would have standing “to challenge a law as enacted in 
93 See id. at 132-33 (noting that Bond also appealed the denial of  her motion to suppress evidence of  the chemicals 
found pursuant to a search warrant of  her home and car, contending that there was no probable cause to support the 
issuance of  the search warrant, and additionally appealed a sentencing enhancement for use of  a special skill in the 
commission of  a crime).
94 Bond I, 581 F.3d, at 131-33.
95 Id. at 134.
96 See id. at 137-41 (rejecting Bond’s vagueness claim, holding that § 229 was neither vague nor overly broad, and 
additionally that the search warrants which Bond contested were supported by probable cause, and that use of  the 
sentencing enhancement for use of  a special skill in the commission of  a crime was appropriate).
97 Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011).
98 Id. at 2364.
The Framers concluded that allocation of  powers between the National 
Government and the States enhances freedom, first by protecting the 
integrity of  the governments themselves, and second by protecting the 
people, from whom all governmental powers are derived. [Because] 
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the 
diffusion of  sovereign power, . . . [f]ederalism also protects the liberty 
of  all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of  
delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. . 
. Federalism secures the freedom of  the individual.” 
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contravention of  constitutional principles of  federalism.”99  Recognizing that Bond had standing to 
contest her conviction on the basis that the statute upon which it was based violated the principles 
of  federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the 
Third Circuit to determine if  the statute was a valid exercise of  Congressional power, because it can 
be “deemed ‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ the President’s Article II, § 2 Treaty 
Power.”100 
Unsurprisingly, the Third Circuit returned to Missouri v. Holland, as its touchstone to resolve 
the Tenth Amendment challenge.101  At its core, the Court stated, Missouri v. Holland teaches that, 
“when there is a valid treaty, Congress has authority to enact implementing legislation under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, even if  it might otherwise lack the ability to legislate in the domain 
in question.”102  In order to qualify as necessary and proper, the legislation and the treaty must be 
rationally related to each other.103 
In evaluating the validity of  the criminal statute challenged by Bond, the court utilized a three-
part analysis, providing a useful template for future cases involving federalism challenges to treaty-
implementing legislation.  First, despite Bond’s concession that the CWC was a proper subject for 
international negotiations, the court evaluated whether the CWC “falls within the Treaty power’s 
appropriate scope.”104  On this question, the court concluded it did. Next, the court evaluated 
whether the implementing legislation was within the Necessary and Proper Clause as sufficiently 
related to the CWC.105  It was.  Finally, and intertwined with the first two considerations, the 
court evaluated whether the provision in some way violated the balance between the federal and 
state powers embodied in the Tenth Amendment.106  However, even after applying this three-part 
assessment, the Third Circuit expressed frustration at the lack of  guidance provided by Holland on 
these three inextricably related considerations, particularly in light of  global changes since 1920.  The 
court posited that the Holland Court may have provided more guidance on the impact of  federalism 
to “assess the validity of  a treaty, and hence of  coextensive treaty-implementing legislation,”107 had it 
been faced with a less clear exercise of  the Treaty power.108 
Evaluation of  the treaty power’s proper subject matter led the court to examine the drafting 
history and contemporaneous discussion of  the Constitution’s treaty provisions.  As the Third 
99 Id.
100 Id. at 2367.
101 United States v. Bond (Bond II), 681 F.3d 149, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting amici positions that the power under 
the Necessary and Proper clause regarding the Treaty Power was limited solely to the power to make treaties, not to 
implement treaties once they were agreed upon, determining the argument was foreclosed by Missouri v. Holland). 
102 Id. at 157.
103 Id. It may be that this aspect of  current doctrine is most susceptible to modification as the federalism 
jurisprudence of  the last two decades comes to be extended into the area of  treaty execution, since mere rationality 
review comes close to rendering Congress the authoritative interpreter of  the scope of  the additional powers that it 
derives from a treaty.
104 Id. at 159.
105 Id. at 162.
106 Id. at 165.
107 Id. at 163.
108 Id. at 163, n. 16.
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Circuit concluded, these provisions indicated almost conclusively that the founders viewed the 
purpose of  treaties as limited to the regulation of  intercourse with foreign nations, and that 
they expected the exercise of  the treaty power was expected to be consistent with those external 
ends.109  At its core, the treaty power encompassed war, peace, negotiation and foreign commerce.  
Additionally, treaties that encroached on matters that ordinarily were left to the states were 
historically within the treaty power’s ambit: “so long as the [international] subject matter limitation 
was satisfied . . . it was accepted that treaties could affect domestic issues.”110 
The Third Circuit evaluated cases and scholarship that contrasted the post-Holland view that the 
Treaty Power was unlimited—that anything two nations chose to negotiate about was by definition 
international in character111—with recent scholarship suggesting that the Treaty Power was, as 
originally contemplated by the Framers, more limited, requiring some minimal international subject 
matter.112  The Third Circuit expressed frustration with the absence of  further clarification by the 
Supreme Court after the Holland decision.  The court recognized that such additional guidance might 
help to evaluate modern multi-lateral treaties, which deal with matters beyond the traditional sphere 
of  the treaty power the framers would have recognized, or to explain the Tenth Amendment’s 
impact as the treaty power expanded beyond those traditional limits and encroached further into 
areas of  traditional state sovereignty.113  Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that the CWC was 
at the core of  the treaty power, addressing “war, peace, and perhaps commerce.”114  Thus, even if  
that power were to be defined restrictively, the CWC fell within its legitimate scope.
Because of  its conclusion (and Bond’s concession) that the CWC fell within the scope of  the 
historically and traditionally recognized treaty power, the court concluded that its implementing 
legislation was valid unless it “somehow goes beyond the Convention.”115  Bond contended that 
the Act covered a wide range of  activity not banned by the Convention, and therefore violated this 
limitation.116  Having already evaluated this claim in its first review of  Bond’s case, the Third Circuit 
restated that “Section 229 . . . closely adheres to the language of  the . . . Convention,”117 and that 
109 Id. at 159.
110 Id. at 160.
111 See United States v. Bond (Bond II), 681 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that earlier Supreme Court decisions 
underscored the view that the Treaty Power, although broad and flexible to address future contingencies extending 
to all proper subjects for international negotiation, was limited by explicit Constitutional prohibitions and had to 
be “consistent with . . . the distribution of  powers between the general and state governments.” The Third Circuit 
contrasted this “traditional view” with that reflected in the restatement (third) oF Foreign relations law oF the 
united states (1987), “flatly rejecting the requirement that treaties involve “only matters of  international concern.” It 
also discussed recent scholarship positing the abandonment of  the view that the Treaty Power is limited to international 
matters).
112 See Bond II, 681 F.3d, at 160-61 (discussing Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 mich. l. 
rev. 390, 395 (1998), and taking exception to Holland to the extent it can be read to say that “the treaty power is immune 
from federalism restrictions because that power has been exclusively delegated to the federal government.”).
113 Bond II, 681 F.3d, at 162.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 165.
116 Id.
117 Id. (citing United States v. Bond (Bond I), 581 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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identical language between the treaty and the statute is not required.118  Applying the test under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to determine, “whether the statute constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of  a constitutionally enumerated power,”119 the Third Circuit 
concluded the CWC was “implemented by sufficiently related legislation.”120 
Finally, the court evaluated Bond’s claim that federalism, as well as affirmative restrictions on 
government power like the First Amendment, imposed limits on the Treaty power.121  Applying 
the clear unequivocal language of  Holland, “that there can be no dispute about the validity of  a 
statute implementing a valid treaty,” the Third Circuit rejected Bond’s Tenth Amendment claim.122  
Evaluating Holland, the court recognized that it had been decided at a time when an implied subject 
matter limitation on the Treaty power existed -- specifically, that the Treaty power must have some 
minimal international focus and was designed to be consistent with the division of  powers between 
the federal and state governments. Thus, the Third Circuit determined that the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that the Tenth Amendment “only reserves those powers that are not delegated and that 
the power to make treaties is delegated” was entirely sensible in Holland, because it involved a treaty 
of  recognizably national interest and co-extensive legislation.123 
Though it acknowledged the significance of  the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the important 
role that federalism plays in preserving individual rights, the Third Circuit nevertheless felt itself  
bound by the clear holding of  Holland.  However, the court also highlighted two intertwined ways 
in which additional Supreme Court guidance could elucidate the meaning of  Holland in future cases 
implicating the Treaty Power. First, the Third Circuit recognized, as a proper subject for judicial 
resolution, the question of  whether a negotiated Treaty falling outside the “traditionally understood 
bounds of  the Treaty Power” had reached a constitutional boundary.124  For the Third Circuit, 
Holland provided no guidance for a court to apply in resolving such a question.  The court was 
reduced to concluding that, “The deliberately vague boundaries of  the Treaty Power would probably 
relegate that court to the unenviable position of  saying it knew a violation when it saw one.”125    
Second, referring back to the “evolving” view of  the Treaty Power in which anything negotiated 
between sovereigns was within the proper subject matter of  the Treaty power, the Third Circuit 
queried:
118 Bond II, 681 F.3d, at 165.
119 Id. (quoting United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010)).
120 Bond II, 681 F.3d, at 165.
121 Id. at 162.
122 Id. at 163-65.
123 Id. at 163 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920)).
124 Bond II, 681 F.3d, at 164, n.18.
125 Id.
Before the outer limits of  the treaty power are reached, however, 
it may be that federalism does have some effect on a treaty’s 
constitutionality. While it is not our prerogative to ignore Holland 
‘s rejection of  federalism limitations upon the Treaty Power, the 
Supreme Court could clarify whether principles of  federalism have 
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Addressing this question would also provide lower courts vital insight into the limits of  
implementing legislation.
In Holland, Justice Holmes reaffirmed the nationalist view of  the Treaty power, seeing it as an 
independent power delegated to the federal government, rather than a means to exercise powers 
otherwise delegated in Article I.127  For Holmes, because the treaty power was an exclusively 
delegated Constitutional power given solely to the federal government, its exercise was necessarily 
supreme over contrary State law.  Additionally for Holmes, a Civil War veteran, the contention that 
States had reserved specified matters from the Treaty power had been largely resolved by the Civil 
War.128  Rather than referring to the states’ rights theory of  the Tenth Amendment which had been 
discredited by the outcome of  the Civil War,129 Holmes’ ‘invisible radiation’ language instead refers 
to more basic structural limitation on federal power vis-à-vis the States.  As explained by Prof. David 
Golove:
126 Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921–22 (1997) (stating that the concept of  dual sovereignty was 
“one of  the Constitution’s structural protections of  liberty”) (internal citations omitted)).
127 Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1257-67.
128 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) ([W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent 
act, like the Constitution  of  the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of  
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of  its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize 
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood 
to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of  our whole experience and not 
merely in that of  what was said a hundred years ago . . . . The only question is whether [the treaty] is forbidden by some 
invisible radiation from the general terms of  the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in 
deciding what that Amendment has reserved.”).
129 See Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1087-88 (stating that under the states’ rights theory, the Treaty 
Power was not a separate power delegated to the federal government, but instead merely one avenue to exercise the 
other powers delegated to the federal government).
any role in assessing an exercise of  the Treaty Power that goes beyond 
the traditionally understood subject matter for treaties.” Holland itself  
indicates that “invisible radiation[s] from the general terms of  the 
Tenth Amendment” may be pertinent in deciding whether there is any 
space between obviously valid treaties and obviously ultra vires treaties 
and whether, in that space, some judicial review of  treaties and their 
implementing legislation may be undertaken to preserve the federal 
structure of  our government. The “invisible radiation[s]” imagery is 
unusual but, in light of  current conceptions about the breadth of  the 
Treaty Power, it may well be worth taking seriously.
[I]n combination with other provisions and general structural 
considerations, . . . the Tenth Amendment provides the states with 
certain special immunities from federal regulation--such as the 
prohibition on Congress to “commandeer” state legislative or executive 
processes or subject states to suit in federal or state court. These more 
nebulous “Tenth Amendment” dignitary limitations arise from, or are 
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As Holmes states in Holland, “We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to 
the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way.”131  Thus, to determine 
whether the “invisible radiations” of  the Tenth Amendment prohibit any particular exercise of  the 
Treaty power, one must determine if  its implementation transgresses either an express prohibition 
of  the Constitution,132 or otherwise violates “state sovereign immunity or dignitary interests.”133 
For the Third Circuit, Holland’s categorical rejection of  federalism limits on the Treaty power 
left unanswered the question of  whether the Tenth Amendment could limit the way in which a 
valid treaty was implemented, perhaps, by incorporating federalism limits into judicial evaluation 
of  an implementing legislation’s nexus to the treaty, or judicial interpretation of  the permissible 
effects of  the domestic operation of  self-executing treaties.  For example, a self- executing treaty or 
implementing congressional legislation could not commandeer state governmental processes. While 
both Congress and the Courts take explicit Constitutional limits into account in implementing or 
interpreting treaties, it is unclear, after Holland, whether more nebulous federalism concerns impose 
additional constraints that should be addressed through judicial interpretation.  Shared criminal 
jurisdiction is not unique to the CWC, the federal government routinely prosecutes as civil rights 
violations, offenses which would otherwise fall under the criminal jurisdiction of  the states.134  As 
Holland made clear, “If  the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of  the statute 
under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the treaty powers of  the 
Government.”135 
The Third Circuit, however, did not have the final say in Bond’s case.  Following the Third 
130 See id. at 1281, n.704 (“There was no question in any of  these cases--nor any doubt--but that Congress’s legislative 
powers extended to the subject matter regulated. The only question was whether the particular fashion in which 
Congress chose to regulate was justified, or whether by the manner in which the regulation applied to the states as states, 
it unconstitutionally trenched upon their sovereign immunity or dignitary interests.”).
131 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
132 See Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1277, n.693 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1957).
133 Treaty-Making and the Nation, supra note 15, at 1281 n.704.
134 See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 16 (1946) (noting that the Mann Act’s criminalization of  interstate 
transportation for “purpose of  prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose” was not unconstitutional 
invasion of  traditional area of  state regulation); see Bond II, 681 F.3d, at 168 (Rendell J., concurring) (“We have a system 
of  dual sovereignty. Instances of  overlapping federal and state criminalization of  similar conduct abound.”); see United 
States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Federal laws criminalizing conduct within traditional areas of  state 
law, whether the states criminalize the same conduct or decline to criminalize it, are of  course commonplace under the 
dual-sovereign concept and involve no infringement per se of  states’ sovereignty in the administration of  their criminal 
laws”).
135 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432; see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901) (“The power of  Congress to make all laws 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution as well the powers enumerated in § 8 of  article I. of  the Constitution as 
all others vested in the government of  the United States, or in any department or the officers thereof, includes the power 
to enact such legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the President by 
and with the advice and consent of  the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power.”).
closely related to, principles of  sovereign immunity, and they apply to 
exercises of  authority that are admittedly within the subject matter 
scope of congressional powers.
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Circuit’s decision upholding her conviction, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari to determine 
the merits of  Ms. Bond’s federalism challenge to the statute.  Many anticipated that the Court 
would use the case to finally address the substance of  Justice Holmes’ “invisible radiations” from 
the Tenth Amendment, or to provide guidance on any subject matter limitations to the Treaty 
Power, or address the scope of  Congress’s ability to legislate to implement a treaty.  No such 
outcome materialized.  Instead the Court reversed Bond’s convictions, not on a constitutional 
basis, but instead on a statutory grounds--its analysis of  § 229 of  the CWC Implementation Act.136  
Exercising the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Court split the implementing legislation 
from its authorizing Treaty.  As the Court explained: “[W]e have no need to interpret the scope of  
the Convention in this case. Bond was prosecuted under section 229—and the statute, unlike the 
Convention—must be read consistent with the principles of  federalism inherent in our constitutional 
structure.”137 
Analyzing the statute, the Court discovered an ambiguity in § 229 that arose from its context, 
an ambiguity created by the broad reach of  § 229’s definition of  a “chemical weapon.”  This 
ambiguity arose solely because of  § 229’s potential broad impact on the traditional allocation of  
law enforcement authority between the Federal government and the States.  This ambiguity led the 
Court to adopt a “clear indication” rule, requiring Congress to clearly indicate its intent to drastically 
alter the traditional balance between State and Federal prerogatives when legislating to implement a 
treaty.  Absent such a clear indication, purely local crimes were not reachable, at least in “this curious 
case”138 where there was no need for such drastic alterations with a Treaty that was instead focused 
on chemical warfare and terrorism.  Thus, because Congress had not clearly stated its intent to reach 
these “purely local crimes” in the CWC Implementation Act, the statute’s criminal proscription did 
not reach Ms. Bond’s purely local assault.139 
a. conseQuences oF Bond
While Ms. Bond may have been spared a federal conviction, it is more noteworthy what the Bond 
Court did not do.  First, it avoided the traditional tools of  treaty interpretation, and made no attempt 
to analyze either the object and purpose of  the CWC, its negotiating history, or its implementing 
legislation.  Instead, discerning a statutory ambiguity from the effect of  the legislation on the 
traditional division of  state and federal authority, it subjected the implementing legislation to a clear 
statement rule, separating the scope of  the implementing legislation from the unanalyzed object and 
136 Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2387-90 (2011).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 2089-90 (Scalia J. concurring) (Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito disagreed that there was any ambiguity 
in the statute, concluding that the language of  § 229 was clear, and unambiguously reached Ms. Bond’s local conduct. 
All three justices, therefore, wrote of  their views of  the Treaty power, with Justice Scalia adopting the most restrictive 
view. For Justice Scalia, Congress only had power under the Necessary and Proper clause to act to assist the President in 
“making” the Treaty. Accordingly, Congress had to rely on a separate Article I power in order to legislate to implement 
a treaty. In effect, Justice Scalia was advocating a constitutional view that had been defeated in the Bricker amendment 
controversies of  the 1950s) and one which is advocated by Nicholas Rosenkrantz in Executing The Treaty Power, supra note 
15.
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purpose of  the treaty it implemented.140  This approach seemed to be inconsistent with the drafting 
history of  the implementing legislation.  When Congress drafted the statute and created federal 
crimes for its violation, it never considered a Tenth Amendment restriction on that jurisdiction, 
instead focusing on other constitutional concerns such as the Fourth Amendment restrictions on 
searches.
Given the Senate’s understanding at the time it adopted the CWC and its implementing 
legislation that, “it seems well settled since Missouri v. Holland that the powers reserved to the 
States under the Tenth Amendment constitute no bar to the exercise of  the treaty power,”141 
this is unsurprising, and logically explains why the CWC Implementation Act contained no clear 
statement on the impact of  the legislation on state powers.  While the rule adopted by the Bond 
Court prospectively may enable Congress to signal when it really means to fully exercise its treaty 
implementing power, it leaves legislation implementing past treaties subject to this new federalism 
impediment.  In fact, on the basis of  Bond, district courts are now engaged in evaluating federalism-
based attacks on other statutes affecting state’s traditional areas, with defendants claiming that Bond 
requires, as a general principle, a clear statement of  Congress’s intent to disturb traditional federal-
state relations, even when Congress was not legislating to implement the treaty power.142 
Further, in requiring Congress to make such a clear statement in treaty-implementing legislation, 
the Court did not discuss how such a remedy would apply when a self-executing treaty affected 
the traditional balance between the Federal and State powers.  While it did imply that a different 
140 Id. at 2090-91 (“These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of  federalism 
embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal statute. In this case, the ambiguity derives from the 
improbably broad reach of  the key statutory definition given the term- “chemical weapon”- being defined; the deeply 
serious consequences of  adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of  any apparent need to do so in light of  the 
context from which the statute arose- a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious 
case, we can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s 
expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police power of  the States . . . it is fully appropriate to apply the 
background assumption that Congress normally preserves ‘the constitutional balance between the National Government 
and the States.’ That assumption is grounded in the very structure of  the Constitution.”); see Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 
554 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Clarity is demanded whenever Congress legislates through the spending power, whether related 
to waivers of  sovereign immunity or not.”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987)); Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (stating that one of  the distinguishing features of  the spending power is that it 
allows Congress to exceed its otherwise limited and enumerated powers by regulating in areas that the vertical structural 
protections of  the Constitution would not otherwise permit).
141 See Senate on Treaties, supra note 5, at 66-70 (listing other theoretical possible challenges to the treaty power than 
that posed by the reserved powers of  the States under the Tenth Amendment, such as: rights conferred upon the 
States by other provisions of  the Constitution; areas requiring participation by the House of  Representatives, such as 
appropriations; those international agreements implicating the judicial power of  the United States, typically seen in 
treaties subjecting the United States to the jurisdiction of  international tribunals; requiring treaties to relate to “proper 
subjects of  negotiation” with a foreign nation; and those affecting rights protected by the Bill of  Rights).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 762 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2014) (Bond’s clear statement rule used to contest prosecution 
for false or misleading information of  biological attack); United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014)(rejecting 
household/local act of  forced labor of  children by parent as federal crime of  forced labor absent clear showing that 
legislation is intended to override the usual constitutional balance of  federal and state powers); Wheeler v. Cross, No. 
14-CV-659-DRH, 2014 WL 3057560 (S.D. Ill. July 7, 2014) (rejecting Bond-based attack on federal prosecution for using 
destructive devise instead of  state arson charge).
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rule might apply,143 the Court did not address self-executing treaties at all. This concern is far from 
illusory.  A much more direct and potentially disruptive effect on the balance between federal and 
state authorities in our constitutional structure is produced by a different category of  treaty related 
to military affairs, the history of  which was discussed above: status of  forces agreements (SOFAs).
B. visiting Forces, status agreements, and the usurPation oF state criminal Jurisdiction?
The Bond case raises potentially significant federalism concerns in relation to treaties regulating 
the means of  warfare.  However, a much more direct and potentially disruptive effect on the balance 
between federal and state authorities in our Constitutional structure is produced by a different 
category of  treaty related to military affairs: status of  forces agreements (SOFAs). Because the 
numbers of  foreign soldiers present in the United States are relatively few in comparison to the 
numbers of  U.S. soldiers overseas, the effect of  these agreements on the federal-state division of  
power has been infrequent Nonetheless, SOFAs offer an important illustration of  the intersection 
of  treaty power and federalism concerns, and how Bond’s clear statement rule could genuinely 
frustrate the nation’s ability to advance its national security interests by reciprocally protecting allied 
forces from assertions of  a state’s criminal power.
The United States hosts over 7000 military students from over 136 nations at 150 schools or 
installations nationwide under its International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.144  
Additionally, at least two German units are permanently stationed in the United States  at Fort Bliss 
in Texas and at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico.145  Thus, there are significant numbers of  
foreign NATO forces and family members as well as significant numbers of  non-NATO military 
personnel engaged in international exchanges present in the United States present at any given 
time.  Although relatively small in number compared with the number of  U.S. forces and associated 
personnel residing overseas, these foreign forces and their families are involved in the same 
proportion of  crimes and accidents as any other inhabitant of  the United States.146 
With a far-flung military presence in dozens of  foreign nations, the United States currently has 
over 100 international SOFA type agreements that address the status of  military forces.147  These 
143 See Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2088 (2011) (“[W]e have no need to interpret the scope of  the Convention 
in this case. Bond was prosecuted under section 229- and the statute, unlike the Convention, must be read consistent with 
the principles of  federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2102 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that it makes sense not to extend the arguable proposition that self-executing treaties are not limited 
by the subject matter of  Article I, §8 to non-self-executing treaties).
144 U.S. Dep’t of  Def. & U.S. Dep’t of  State Joint Report to Cong., Foreign Military Training In Fiscal Years 2010 and 
2011, Vol. I & II (Country Training Activities), at II-2, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171500.pdf.
145 Both are exclusive federal jurisdictions, although a small portion of  a housing area at Holloman is under the 
concurrent jurisdiction of  the federal government and New Mexico. See generally 2012 Operational Law Handbook, supra 
note 54, at 125. 
146 See Martha Stamsell-Liming, Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Inside the United States: The Other Side of  the Coin, 28 a.F. l. 
rev. 133 (1988) (describing the types of  offenses that foreign forces and their families can be involved in and is equally 
illustrative of  situations today).
147 See CRS SOFA Report, supra note 38, at 1; see also The Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Regarding the Status of  Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter NATO 
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agreements can be bi-lateral, multi-lateral, reciprocal or non-reciprocal.  With the exception of  the 
multi-lateral North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA- the only SOFA that is a treaty148- 
most SOFAs take the form of  executive agreements, some of  which are concluded on the basis 
of  authority contained in a treaty, while others are based on other congressional authority, and 
still others, more loosely associated with other defense agreements or based on exclusive executive 
authority.149  Because the domestic legal effect of  the alternatives to formal Article II, section 2 
treaties is far from settled, the form of  the SOFA can be critical is assessing its federalism impact.  
Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of  the land under the Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, the effect of  a SOFA concluded by executive agreement would not necessarily have the same 
domestic force and effect.  Accordingly, any interference with a state criminal prosecution arising 
from operation of  a SOFA, particularly the typical executive agreement type SOFA, could very easily 
trigger federalism concerns and state initiated challenge to the effect of  the agreement.  Because the 
NATO SOFA jurisdictional framework is considered a benchmark and model for all other SOFA 
type agreements, examination of  its criminal jurisdiction provisions is critical to understanding the 
potential impact of  SOFAs on federalism.150 
Article VII of  the NATO SOFA151 grants exclusive criminal jurisdiction where only the laws of  
SOFA Treaty], available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm.
148 CRS SOFA Report, supra note 38, at 1.
149 Congress authorizes these executive agreements either before or after the executive agreement, or under the 
President’s independent foreign affairs powers. The majority of  U.S. SOFAs have mutual defense or security treaties as 
their underlying basis. Many of  our mutual defense treaties, either include specific authorization for SOFAs, or are relied 
upon as authority for a SOFA. See e.g., CRS SOFA Report, supra note 38, at 6, 11-14, 17 (stating that Japan has specific 
provision in treaty authorizing SOFA; Korea has a specific provision in treaty authorizing SOFA; the Philippines has no 
specific SOFA authorization provision in treaty; Australia has no specific SOFA authorization provision in treaty).
150 Other potential allocations of  criminal jurisdiction in SOFA include: exclusive jurisdiction in the sending state; 
shared jurisdiction along the NATO SOFA model- according a member of  the force a status equivalent to the technical 
and administrative staff  of  the U.S. Embassy in that country, a status that under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations of  April 18, 1961 amounts to immunity from prosecution by the receiving state; or a SOFA can provide no 
special status leaving U.S. military personnel fully subject to the jurisdiction of  the receiving state. See 2012 Operational 
Law Handbook, supra note 54, at 120.
151 NATO SOFA Treaty, art. VII:
1. Subject to the provisions of  this Article,
(a)) the military authorities of  the sending State shall have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and 
disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of  the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of  
that State;
(b)) the authorities of  the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members of  a force or civilian component and 
their dependents with respect to offenses committed within the territory of  the receiving State and punishable by the law 
of  that State. 2.—(a) The military authorities of  the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
over persons subject to the military law of  that State with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its security, 
punishable by the law of  the sending State, but not by the law of  the receiving State.
(b)The authorities of  the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of  a force 
or civilian components and their dependents with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of  that 
State, punishable by its law but not by the law of  the sending State.
(c)) For the purposes of  this paragraph and of  paragraph 3 of  this Article a security offense against a State shall include
(i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of  any law relating to official secrets of  that State, or secrets relating to the national 
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one state are broken;152 in all other cases the NATO SOFA grants concurrent jurisdiction to both 
the sending and receiving state. In other words, if  a service-member covered by the SOFA commits 
an act that violates the law of  only one state, that state has exclusive jurisdiction. But in the much 
more common situation where the conduct violates the laws of  both the sending and receiving state, 
jurisdiction is concurrent.
Within this category of  concurrent jurisdiction, the SOFA allocates the primary right to exercise 
jurisdiction to the sending state for acts or omissions arising from the performance of  official 
duties or for inter se cases where “both the accused and the victim are members of  the sending 
state.”153  The receiving state is granted primary jurisdiction in all other cases.  In cases of  concurrent 
jurisdiction, either state may cede their right of  primary jurisdiction to the other.
This jurisdictional allocation creates the potential for interference with U.S. state criminal 
proceedings in the two situations of  concurrent jurisdiction: - cases arising from official duty 
and inter se cases.154  In both these situations, the foreign sending State would have the primary 
defense of  that State.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(i) The military authorities of  the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of  a 
force or of  a civilian component in relation to
(ii) offenses solely against the property or security of  that State, or offenses solely against the person or property of  
another member of  the force or civilian component of  that State or of  a dependent;
(iii) offenses arising out of  any act or omission in the performance of  official duty.
(a)) In the case of  any other offense the authorities of  the receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise 
jurisdiction.
(b)) If  the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of  the other 
State as soon as practicable. The authorities of  the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to 
a request from the authorities of  the other State for a waiver of  its right in cases where that other State considers such 
waiver to be of  particular importance.
4. The foregoing provisions of  this Article shall not imply any right for the military authorities of  the sending State to 
exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of  or ordinarily resident in the receiving State, unless they are mem-
bers of  the force of  the sending State.”
4 U.S.T. 1792; T.I.A.S. 2846; 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
152 For example purely military offenses, such as sleeping on guard duty or dereliction of  duty, or more generally 
espionage or sabotage against the home country.
153 See Superveille, supra note 38, at 6; see also NATO SOFA Treaty, supra note 147, at art. VII (3)(a)(i).
154 U.S. states have criminal jurisdiction over all offenses that occur within their sovereign territory, which includes any 
offenses committed by U.S. or visiting allied service members off  the military installation where they are stationed, and 
in many cases even offenses committed on the installation (where the federal government has concurrent jurisdiction 
with or leases the land from the state). The exercise of  executive, legislative, and judicial authority on federal military 
installations can either be held exclusively by the federal government (exclusive federal jurisdiction) or by both the 
federal and state governments (concurrent jurisdiction). Exclusive federal jurisdiction is obtained either through cession 
from a state when the military installation is created or through a reservation by the U.S. concerning the installation when 
a state is admitted to the Union. Therefore, in addition to its off-post jurisdiction the state will have jurisdiction for on-
post offenses if  the installation is subject to concurrent state and federal legislative jurisdiction. Under exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, the federal government then exercises sole authority over the installation. Under concurrent jurisdiction, the 
federal government has the power to exercise its full authority over the installation, but the state in which the installation 
is located retains the right to simultaneously exercise its authority along with the federal government. The federal 
government may also own property in a proprietary status but enjoys no special jurisdictional power over the property 
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right to exercise jurisdiction, a right granted by an international agreement with the United States.  
This means the United States would be obligated to allow the sending state to assert jurisdiction 
and would preclude the assertion of  U.S. jurisdiction absent a waiver by the sending state. But 
what exactly is U.S. jurisdiction in such a context? Does such a SOFA foreclose the assertion of  
jurisdiction by only the federal government? Or does the agreement prohibit the state from asserting 
jurisdiction for a crime that occurs in its territory whenever the sending state chooses to assert its 
primacy under the SOFA? Considering that most criminal law in the United States is administered 
primarily by the states, this is a profoundly significant question, and for the NATO SOFA treaty was 
one explicitly considered by the Senate.
Examples of  cases where the sending state has the primary right of  jurisdiction highlight 
the tensions that can emerge between state and federal authorities when compliance with an 
international treaty or international agreement is at stake.  Two hypothetical examples involving the 
German forces stationed in Texas and New Mexico illustrate the potential for federalism concerns 
produced by the NATO SOFA.155  First, recall that the SOFA grants the sending state primary 
jurisdiction for official duty offenses.  If  an on-duty German military member kills an American 
citizen as the result of  an automobile accident while driving an official German military vehicle off-
post,156 the State of  New Mexico or Texas would ordinarily have jurisdiction to charge the German 
driver with vehicular homicide or other applicable criminal offense.  However, because the alleged 
criminal act occurred while the soldier was in an official-duty status, the German government (as 
the sending State) would have a treaty-based right to assert primary jurisdiction for this offense.157  
and is therefore fully subject to state laws with some restrictions on state laws that may interfere with performance of  
the federal function. Under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. section 3, acts or omissions that would constitute 
crimes under the state law in which the installation is located will constitute similar federal crimes if  the act occurs in an 
area under federal jurisdiction (either concurrent or exclusive). See u.s. deP’t oF army Field manual 19-10, military 
Police law and order oPerations, 47-49 (1987); see also Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 31 (explaining 
that because many federal military installations have been formed over the years, it is possible that some portions of  
an installation may be subject to concurrent state jurisdiction and some to exclusive federal jurisdiction. So the location 
of  the offense will determine whether the federal government alone or the state and federal government will have 
jurisdiction over the offense. Some installations can be subject to federal jurisdiction and the concurrent jurisdiction 
of  more than one state. For example, Fort Campbell straddles the boundary between Tennessee and Kentucky, and 
is a concurrent jurisdiction installation subject to the laws of  either Kentucky or Tennessee depending on where on 
the installation a criminal act occurs. Other installations formed over a lengthy period of  time will have some areas of  
exclusive federal jurisdiction and others of  concurrent jurisdiction).
155 Use of  German forces as examples is solely because their presence in the U.S. is long-standing. It involves the 
stationing of  German units in the U.S. and does not imply any proclivity or tendency by the German forces to violate 
the law. This permanent stationing encompasses the presence of  the friendly foreign force and their families and is a 
closer analog for the reciprocal treatment given by Germany to the many hundreds of  thousands of  U.S. forces stationed 
in Germany under the NATO SOFA since 1955.
156 See Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 70 (The ratifying Senate considered this exact scenario in its 
considerations of  the NATO SOFA Treaty and its potential domestic consequences for State criminal jurisdiction.)
157 The German military disciplinary system authorizes disciplinary courts-martial by its commanders, but these 
proceedings have no power to impose real criminal penalties. Their authority is similar to the U.S. non-judicial 
punishment authority under Article 15 of  the U.C.M.J. For actual criminal proceedings the German military or family 
member is returned to Germany and is prosecuted by the State Prosecutor for the German State from which he comes. 
In a recent case involving a German service member accused of  child abuse off  base in Alamogordo, New Mexico, the 
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In the second type of  case, a foreign military member might commit spouse or child abuse in the 
family’s off-post residence.  Assuming both the victim and the accused in this hypothetical are 
German citizens present in the United States under the provisions of  the SOFA, this is an “inter se” 
case, and again, under Article VII Germany would have primary jurisdiction.158
It is easy to comprehend the sensitivities of  local prosecutors and courts in cases involving 
these and other types of  criminal misconduct committed in their jurisdictions.159  Nevertheless, 
a local court would be expected to analyze the provisions of  the SOFA to determine the treaty-
imposed limitations on the exercise of  its own jurisdiction, and in these cases, forego prosecution 
or dismiss160 charges absent a German waiver of  the right to exercise primary jurisdiction.  If, 
however, the local court refused to defer to the German assertion of  primary jurisdiction - the 
outcome mandated by Article VII of  the NATO SOFA - the state through the decision of  the 
local prosecutor or state judge, would effectively force the United States to breach its international 
obligations.
Interestingly, the Senate appears to have contemplated these type of  conflicts when it considered 
the NATO SOFA during ratification hearings.  In order to illustrate the potential interference with 
local elected District Attorney (DA) brought charges in New Mexico state court against the German service member. 
The local DA refused to dismiss the charges when the German government requested she do so in accordance with 
Article VII of  the NATO SOFA as they had primary jurisdiction over this inter se case.  Her refusal resulted in significant 
diplomatic discussions between the German government and the U.S. Department of  State and Defense. Resort to 
the State of  New Mexico Attorney General was unsuccessful as the local DA was an independent elected state official 
not subject to their oversight. Ultimately, the DA agreed to dismiss the charges and the German government returned 
their serviceman to Germany to face charges in German criminal court.  The German government was also concerned 
that the case be returned to Germany so that appropriate child welfare agencies could become involved with the 
family. The local state judge had not been informed of  the NATO SOFA issue. Telephone interview with Mr. Emil 
Brupbacher, Jr., Attorney-Advisor (Int’l), Office of  the Staff  J. Advocate, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M. (Oct. 26, 
2012); see Martha Stamsell-Liming, Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Inside the United States: The Other Side of  the Coin, supra note 
146, at 149 (explaining that in addition to inter se cases, other on-duty accidents could easily generate strong state interest 
in prosecuting a foreign service member; for example one can envision the local interest in prosecuting negligence 
in an aircraft crash, a shooting by a German sentry, or a shooting accident during weapons training that injured local 
civilians. To understand the degree of  state interest, significant tensions exist between state governments and the federal 
government concerning the application of  state law to U.S. service members for on-duty criminal offenses under 
state law); see Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Stafford, How to Keep Military Personnel From Going to Jail for Doing the Right Thing: 
Jurisdiction, ROE and the Rules of  Deadly Force, 2000-nov. army law. 1 (2000) (discussing criminal law issues in context 
of  SOFAs and state-federal criminal law issues, particularly of  differing self-defense justifications in various U.S. state 
courts).
158 These two examples are equally present and sensitive when U.S. forces are present in Germany and commit 
offenses, and because of  the numbers of  U.S. forces present in Germany in the past 60 years, are more prevalent.
159 The interests of  the U.S. state are easy to comprehend but similar cases have occurred in Germany since the 
NATO SOFA took effect over 60 years ago, and the German authorities, taking seriously their obligation to give 
sympathetic consideration to requests to waive primary jurisdiction, have frequently waived their primary right to 
prosecute American soldiers for equally serious injuries to German citizens. A refusal by a local state court to recognize 
a German right of  primary jurisdiction under the SOFA could have serious ramifications to this on-going relationship to 
the detriment of  overseas U.S. soldiers. These cases do occur, and they are usually handled by coordination between the 
local military base, the local prosecutor, and on occasion, the Department of  Defense, the Foreign Government, and the 
local U.S. Attorney.
160 Or abate the case pending a German decision on ceding its primary jurisdiction.
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state’s rights, the Senate explicitly discussed the impact of  the NATO SOFA jurisdictional sharing 
provisions on a hypothetical foreign soldier in the United States involved in an automobile accident 
while on official duty resulting in injury or fatality to a U.S. citizen. The Senate fully understood that 
if  ratified, Article VII161 would alter state criminal law under the Supremacy Clause, and further, it 
would regularly fall to the state courts to implement NATO SOFA obligations.  Thus, the Senate 
envisioned a local court determining its own jurisdiction under the SOFA and the Supremacy 
Clause and dismissing any case in which the SOFA granted the primary right of  prosecution to the 
foreign sending state.  It is therefore clear the Senate understood the seriousness of  this potential 
interference with U.S. state criminal jurisdiction. However, it also understood that permitting this 
interference was necessary to protect U.S. forces abroad from the plenary territorial sovereignty of  
allied receiving states, a trade-off  certainly influenced by the expectation that U.S. forces would be 
affected by the SOFA far more frequently than allied forces in the United States.162 
In its hearings on the NATO SOFA the Senate expressed the understanding that state courts 
would comply with the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and properly limit their own jurisdiction to 
try the foreign military member in accordance with the SOFA’s provisions.  Furthermore, because 
the Senate considered the provisions of  the NATO SOFA to be self-executing, Congress never 
passed explicit implementing laws that would allow the federal government to compel dismissal 
of  the state criminal proceeding if  it believed the state court did not properly interpret the SOFA 
provisions.163  Indeed, in its hearings the Senate recognized that there was no real federal remedy 
if  the local state criminal court improperly determined that it had jurisdiction over a visiting force 
member when the foreign sending state disagreed.  Instead, such disparate interpretations of  the 
SOFAs concurrent jurisdiction provision would be left to “the realm of  international negotiation.”164 
Such an unresolved breach could easily lead to retaliatory action by our NATO allies, affecting U.S. 
military members and their families overseas, but also the integrity of  the defense alliance itself.  
This is especially true in our modern era, when unlike the height of  the Cold War, foreign hosts of  
U.S. forces often perceive the U.S. military presence to be of  less interest to their own security than 
to that of  the U.S.
Accordingly, enforcement of  the NATO SOFA, and other analogous status agreements, is 
functionally dependent on a state court recognition and application of  the SOFA’s allocation of  
concurrent jurisdiction- recognition ostensibly mandated by the Supremacy Clause for treaties, 
and from the federal government perspective, hopefully for executive agreements as well.  This 
enforcement is well within a state court’s capabilities.  However, should a court prove obdurate 
161 See NATO SOFA Treaty, supra note 147, at art. VII; see generally Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 70-
74.
162 Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 75.
163 The NATO SOFA is considered by the Department of  Justice to be a self-executing treaty. See Stamsell-Liming, 
supra note 146, at n.27 (quoting Department of  Justice legal opinion to that effect).
164 See Senate NATO SOFA Hearing, supra note 71, at 71 (explaining that although this type of  statement has been 
used to distinguish self-executing from non-self-executing treaty provisions in some court cases, the complete context 
of  the Senate hearings establishes that the Senators understood that the treaty provisions would be directly applicable 
and become “the supreme law of  the land” such that state court judges would be expected to apply Article VII of  the 
NATO SOFA).
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or a local prosecutor unconvinced of  the importance of  these SOFA provisions when weighed 
against local sovereignty and the interests of  the local community, it would prove difficult to enforce 
compliance with these treaty provisions.  Ironically, this was a problem the Founders certainly 
appreciated, as compliance with Treaty obligations was a driving reason for the failure of  the 
Confederation.165     
Nonetheless, because they remove state criminal jurisdiction where the sending state has primary 
jurisdiction, SOFAs affect a traditional and core area of  state sovereignty in the most fundamental 
way.  Still, given that the Senate consented to the NATO SOFA Treaty as it was rejecting Senator 
Bricker’s proposed constitutional amendment to overturn Missouri v. Holland, which explicitly 
permitted interference with traditional state prerogatives under the treaty power, any state failure 
to comply with the NATO SOFA’s jurisdictional provisions would be particularly ironic. Bond, as 
resolved by the Supreme Court, only defers resolution of  the extent of  the ‘invisible radiations’ 
arising from the Tenth Amendment on treaty-implementing legislation, and does not address 
what limitations, if  any, exist when, as directly contemplated by the Founders, the treaty is self-
executing.166 
other soFas: executive & congressional-executive agreements
While the NATO SOFA is the sole SOFA concluded as a treaty, the United States “is 
currently party to over 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs.”167  These agreements 
can be bi-lateral, multi-lateral, reciprocal or non-reciprocal, and most SOFAs take the form of  
executive agreements.168  The form of  the SOFA agreement can arguably impact its domestic legal 
165 See, e.g., 1 the records oF the Federal convention oF 1787, at 19, 47, 164, 225, 245, 323 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911).  These cases become even more complex when the SOFA at issue in a particular case was entered into as a 
congressional-executive agreement, such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) SOFA, the various agreements under which 
were executed as Congressional-Executive agreements).
166 As for the NATO SOFA, the complete removal of  a State’s criminal jurisdiction is a “dramatic departure from 
that constitutional structure and a serious reallocation of  criminal law enforcement authority between the Federal 
Government and the States. See Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2093 (2014).  For a self-executing treaty such as the 
NATO SOFA, the Senate’s consideration and understanding of  this effect, after explicit discussion about its effects in 
its deliberations on ratification, should amount to the “clear indication” of  the Senate’s intent to affect such a dramatic 
departure).
167 CRS SOFA Report, supra note 38, at 1.
168 These are authorized or approved by Congress either before or after the executive agreement, or under the 
President’s independent foreign affairs powers. The majority of  U.S. SOFAs have mutual defense or security treaties 
as their underlying basis. Many of  our mutual defense treaties, either include specific authorization for SOFAs, or are 
relied upon as authority for a SOFA. See, e.g., CRS SOFA Report, supra note 38, at 6, 11; see also Michael John Garcia & R. 
Chuck Mason, Congressional Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States, 
u.s. congressional research service, Jun. 2009, at 2 (R40614; Jun. 7, 2012) (“[T]here are three types of  prima facie legal 
executive agreements: (1) congressional-executive agreements, in which Congress has previously or retroactively authorized 
an executive agreement entered into by the executive; (2) executive agreements made pursuant to an earlier treaty, in which 
agreement is authorized by a ratified treaty; and (3) sole executive agreements, in which the agreement is made pursuant to 
the President’s constitutional authority without further congressional authorization.”), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R40614.pdf  http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40614.pdf  (last visited on Jul. 29, 2014).
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consequences.  If  the President is authorized by Congress to negotiate and conclude international 
agreements on particular subjects, or if  the agreement is approved by a joint resolution of  Congress, 
these “Congressional-Executive” agreements have been considered the equivalent of  a treaty.169  
Although treaties clearly operate as the supreme law of  the land under the Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, the domestic effect of  a SOFA concluded by congressional-executive agreement could 
arguably be subject to Bond’s clear indication rule before it could affect the traditional division of  law 
enforcement authority between federal and state governments. Although most SOFA agreements 
have been entered into as part of  an overall mutual or bi-lateral defense or security agreements, 
only the NATO SOFA and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) SOFA are reciprocal, posing federalism 
concerns in their enforcement.
As part of  post-Cold War diplomacy, the PfP Agreement authorized the establishment of  
bilateral agreements between NATO and individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries, usually 
former Warsaw pact countries, to encourage their democratization and integration with Europe 
and NATO.170  The PfP applies most of  the provisions of  the NATO SOFA bilaterally between 
signatory states of  the PfP and NATO member nations.171  In 1994, Congress authorized the 
President to apply the provisions of  the reciprocal NATO SOFA to PfP nations by entering into 
executive agreements to that effect.172  As of  2012, an additional 24 counties are subject to the 
169 See henkin, supra note 5, at 217 (“[I]t is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is 
available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty: the President can seek approval of  any 
agreement by joint resolution of  both houses of  Congress rather than by two-thirds of  the Senate. Like a treaty, such 
an agreement is the law of  the land, superseding inconsistent state laws, as well as inconsistent provisions in earlier 
treaties, in other international agreements, or in acts of  Congress.”); see also restatement (third) oF Foreign relations 
law oF the united states § 303 & comment (e) (1987) (“The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive 
agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”); Senate on Treaties, supra note 5, at 5 
(“The constitutionality of  this type of  agreement seems well established and Congress has authorized or approved them 
frequently.”); Michael Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 n.c. l. rev. 133 (1998) (stating that the 
domestic legal effect of  sole executive agreements are subject to considerable more controversy; however, because none 
of  the SOFAs concluded as a sole executive agreement are reciprocal, this article will not discuss the domestic effect of  
these agreements).
170 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of  State, The 20th Anniversary of  the Partnership for Peace (Jan. 11, 2014) 
(stating that PfP brings together 22 nations with NATO, 12 of  which have become full NATO members), available 
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219560.htm; The Senate Resolution on NATO Expansion, arms 
control association (Apr. 30, 1998) https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_04/srap98; see generally, Partnership for 
Peace Programme, north atlantic treaty organization (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_50349.htm.
171 See Partnership for Peace Status of  Forces Agreement, north atlantic treaty organization (Apr. 29, 2014), http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50086.htm.
172 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 514(b), 108 Stat. 382 
(1994) (“Authority of  the President-The President is authorized to confer, pursuant to agreement with any country 
eligible to participate in the Partnership for Peace, rights in respect of  the military and related civilian personnel 
(including dependents of  any such personnel) and activities of  that country in the United States comparable to the rights 
conferred by that country in respect of  the military and related civilian personnel (including dependents of  any such 
personnel) and activities of  the United States in that country”); Partnership for Peace Status of  Forces Agreement, supra note 
167 (“All states that are party to the [PfP] agreement grant the same legal status to forces of  the other parties when these 
are present on their territory . . . . A common status and an important degree of  equal treatment will be reached, which 
will contribute to the equality between partners.”).
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NATO SOFA through implementation of  the PfP Agreement through executive agreement, 
with the NATO SOFA implemented by a treaty, and the PfP SOFA by a congressional-executive 
agreement.  Between the NATO SOFA and the PfP SOFA, the U.S. has common reciprocal SOFA 
arrangements with approximately 58 countries, amounting to over half  the SOFA arrangements 
currently in place.173 
Just as the Supreme Court did not discuss the effects of  its requirement for a clear indication 
that Congress sought to change the traditional balance of  criminal authority, it also did not discuss 
whether and how such a clear indication would be shown when the source of  the change was a 
congressional-executive agreement, such as the PfP SOFA agreements.  The Senate in considering 
the NATO SOFA did understand, and accept, the effect of  the SOFA’s criminal jurisdiction 
provisions on traditional state criminal jurisdiction.  While Congress clearly authorized the President 
to enter into these reciprocal PfP SOFA arrangements, and because the underlying PfP agreement 
requires direct application of  the NATO SOFA provisions to these new countries,174 they should 
have equal domestic effect.  Nevertheless, just as the effect of  the Bond decision on self-executing 
treaties is unknown, so too will be its effect on a reciprocal SOFA entered into as a congressional-
executive agreement.  Here, it is clear that reciprocity was authorized by Congress in the context of  
extending the NATO SOFA protections to PfP nations.  Presumably, Congress in extending these 
provisions did so with the knowledge that the NATO SOFA itself  was a self-executing treaty, and 
applied directly to affect state criminal jurisdiction. Such common sense evaluation of  the statutory 
effect, however, may not be the sort of  clear indication mandated by the Supreme Court in Bond.
conclusion
Limitations imposed on federal power pursuant to the U.S. federalist system of  government 
are central to our democracy.  However the exercise of  the national treaty power, and the 
implementation of  these agreements, have historically been immune from these limitations.  This 
may no longer be the case as federalism concerns are now impacting the nation’s implementation 
of  core LOAC treaty obligations. The Bond case demonstrates that individual citizens will have 
standing to contest the validity of  implementing legislation or perhaps self-executing treaties in 
circumscribing their behavior in areas traditionally reserved to the states. 
Although not resolving Justice Holmes’ ‘invisible radiations’ from the Tenth Amendment, Bond 
establishes that implementing legislation will not be interpreted to interfere with the traditional 
division of  law enforcement authority between Federal and State governments absent a clear 
indication from Congress of  that intent.  Lurking in the background are SOFA treaties, treaties that 
reflect fundamental foreign policy, war powers, and national security decisions of  the nation, but 
that similarly implicate the core of  traditional states’ areas of  responsibility in our federal system.  
Given the central concern of  the Founders during the drafting of  the Constitution over the States’ 
173 CRS SOFA Report, supra note 368, at 2.
174 See Partnership for Peace Status of  Forces Agreement, supra note 171 (explaining that the PfP SOFA applies- with the 
necessary changes having been made- most of  the provisions of  an agreement between NATO member states, which 
was formed in London on 19 June 1951; some provisions of  this so-called NATO SOFA cannot be applied to partner 
countries for technical reasons).
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interference with the fulfillment of  national treaty obligations, it is particularly ironic that federalism 
may still have an impact on such an important function of  the federal government in the 21st 
Century.
Awareness of  the periodic ebbs and flows of  the relationship between the nation’s treaty 
powers and federalism, against the backdrop of  our nation’s history, indicate that Congress and 
the President should directly address the federalism concerns extant in relation to adoption of  
treaties and other international agreements.  The current position of  the Supreme Court reflects 
these historic divides.  Just as our Founders wrestled with the creation of  unified nation capable 
of  acting on the world stage as a legitimate member of  the family of  nations, the Court should 
carefully consider rulings, which in the name of  federalism, emasculate the nation as a responsible 
international actor and compromise its vital national security interests.  In spite of  Justice Holmes 
resolution of  questions related to the scope of  the treaty power framed by the outcome of  the 
Civil War, and President Eisenhower by the rejection of  Senator Bricker’s proposed constitutional 
amendments, Bond seems to have only exacerbated federalism uncertainty.  The political branches 
must take up the mantle and provide much clearer statements of  their expectation that treaties and 
international agreements, especially those related to status of  visiting forces, trump states’ rights.  
